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The financing history of urban water infrastructure in Paris 
(1807-1925) : lessons from the past to enlighten present and future 
challenges1 ? 
Olivier Crespi Reghizzi2,3  
Abstract 
Sustainable financing is a major challenge for the water sector both in many developing 
countries where water and sanitation services are still in the expansion phase and in Europe 
where the water industry is faced to major investments needs too. To give more depth to the 
present policy debate a historical perspective on water services financing is needed. This 
paper is focused on the financing history of the Paris water infrastructure brought to 
completion in the 1807-1925 time frame (Ourcq canal, water supply network and sewers, long 
distance aqueducts, water treatment plants, waste water treatment units). A variety of 
financing schemes and institutional solutions (municipal budget - fiscal resources, concession, 
municipal bond and land added value capture schemes) are identified and described. A deeper 
analysis is made on the financial flows of Paris’ water, sanitation and canals service over the 
1893-1930 time frame. A discussion on the institutional choices and on the long run cost 
allocation of the chosen financing schemes is made. It appears that long term debt, inflation 
and land added value capture mechanisms played key roles in absorbing part of the 
investments’ costs. 
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1 Introduction 
In most developing countries water services are still in the early phase of development and 
network expansion. The water industry is very capital intensive and requires huge lump sum 
investments particularly in the early phase of ewpanding the infrastructure. In a historical 
perspective how to finance these investments has constantly been a major concern, not always 
easy to solve.  
In the last ten years great attention has been given by international institutions and donors to 
the issue of sustainable financing for the water sector through various working panels4. This 
process led around the Istanbul 2009 World Water forum to the OECD publications (OECD 
2009) clarifying concepts and defining a harmonized terminology on costs and financing 
sources well known as the “3T’s” (Tariffs, Taxes and Transfers). 
The issue was also picked up again in 2012 at the World Water Forum in Marseille where the 
whole “Condition for Success 2 -Financing water for all” was focused on the concepts of the 
3T’s and of “Sustainable Cost Recovery” (Tremolet 2012a; Tremolet 2012b). In those 
sessions many speakers made references to what were the financing solutions adopted in the 
past stating that “looking back at how water investments have been financed in the past can 
give us clues as to what solutions could be defined in the future” (Tremolet 2012a).  
It should be pointed out however that sufficient and sustainable financing for water 
infrastructure is a crucial factor not only in developing countries where modern water services 
are still in an expansion phase but also in Europe where they are now a “mature industry5 with 
an increasing need to reproduce the (huge) infrastructure capital which was set up over 
decades” (Barraqué 2009).   
Indeed the sustainability of water services in Europe is presently challenged by two 
contradictory changes. On one hand, compliance with stricter sanitary and environmental 
standards and networks renewal’s burden induce an increase in water costs. On the other hand 
water consumption is decreasing in many big cities such as Paris (Barraqué et al. 2011; 
                                                 
 
4 Such as the ones chaired by Mr Camdessus and Mr Gurria which produced various reports (Van Hofwegen 
2006; Winpenny 2003). 
5 Mr Gurria, General Secretary of OECD, also pointed out during his Marseille opening speech that “ huge costs 
are now to be faced to replace and modernise ageing water infrastructure, and to upgrade systems to meet stricter 
quality standards” (Gurria 2012). 
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Souriau 2011). Water industry is characterised by costs which are mainly fixed while income 
is mainly proportional to sold volumes. The economical, social and environmental 
sustainability (as defined by Correia 2001; Barraqué 2003a; Barraqué 2005; Lejars and 
Canneva 2009) of water industry is thus jeopardized6.  
The present policy debate on the water sector is challenging. We believe that adopting a “long 
run” historical perspective on water financing can be highly beneficial to give more depth to 
the debate and enlighten present and future challenges both in developing countries and in 
Europe.  
2 Water and sanitation infrastructure for the French capital city 
(1807-1925) 
We chose to focus the present paper on the major expansion phase of modern water and 
sanitation infrastructure in Paris. Our historical analysis starts in 1807 with the construction of 
the Ourcq canal and ends in 1925 with the completion of the Voulzie operation, the last long 
distance aqueduct built in Paris.  
In 1807 no more than 8000 m3/day of drinking water were distributed by the Paris municipal 
water service for more than 546 0007 inhabitants. Water was mostly pumped from the Seine 
through fire pumps (6833 m3/day) even if some water also came from the aqueduct d’Arcueil 
and the Sources du Nord (respectively 960 and 288 m3/day). 120 years later, in 1926, Paris 
water infrastructure allowed to deliver roughly 1 323 9608 m3/day to the 2 871 429 
inhabitants.  Indeed by 1925 a large part of Paris “modern” water infrastructure had been 
built. 
In the beginning of the 19th century the first need was to bring large quantities of clean water 
to the city. This trend is analyzed by Bernard Barraqué as being part of the first of three 
engineering paradigms through which water industry history can be framed: a) “the paradigm 
of water quantity and water systems”, b) “the paradigm of water treatment and water quality “ 
and c) “the paradigm of environmental engineering” (Barraqué 2003b; Barraqué, Britto, and 
                                                 
 
6 The EAU&3E research project, seeks to analyze this major sustainability challenge 
(http://eau3e.hypotheses.org/ ) from various points of view (environmental, social, economic, governance). Our 
research is financed by the Paris water operator Eau de Paris in the framework of the EAU&3E research project. 
7 Population of Paris in 1801 (Bocquet, Chatzis, and Sander 2008) 
8 Including Ourcq water. The daily average amount without considering Ourcq water was of 1 087 852 m3/day or 
379 l/hab/day. 
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Formiga Johnsson). For instance, the first paradigm was the idea behind the construction in 
Paris of the Canal de l’Ourcq (section 3) and of the long distance gravity aqueducts which 
were built after 1862 (paragraphs 5.4, 5.5 and Table 11) to bring water from natural and 
unspoilt environments far from the city. 
Once clean water was made available, the next step was to expand the water network to 
distribute it (firstly for free at public fountains, the so called “Service Public” and later 
through private connections “à l’étage”, the “Service Privé”) and also to collect waste water 
with a sewer system (Table 5, Table 10, Box 3 and paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5). That sewer 
system was however not solving Seine’s pollution issue: a waste treatment system had to be 
built (Box 3 and paragraph 5.5).  
The main steps in the investment history of Paris’s water infrastructure are summarized in the 
following table. Not only very different infrastructures were built but also a variety of 
financing tools (municipal budget - fiscal resources, concession, municipal bond and 
integrated urban development schemes) were adopted to support their cost.  
Table 1 : Main phases in the investment history of the Paris water service in the 19th century, in grey 
investment phases which can be seen as examples of the “paradigm of water quantity”. 
Years Investment phase Historical phase  Comments 
1803 - 1814 Ourcq phase 1 Premier empire   
1818-1822 Ourcq phase 2 Restauration Private concession on the 
Canal de l’Ourcq and canal 
Saint Martin 
1806-1823 Sewer system phase 1 Premier empire and 
Restauration 
 
1824 - 1839 Sewer system phase 2 Restauration  Mainly after 1831  
1806 - 1848 Water distribution network 
phase 1 
Premier Empire + 
Restauration 
Mainly after 1831 
1860 Annexion of the banlieue within the Paris municipality and régie interessée with the 
Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
1862 - 1925 Gravity aqueducts and tanks Second empire and 
Troisième République 
Dhuis, Vanne, Vigne et Avre, 
Loing et Lunain, Voulzie 
1853 - 1880 Water distribution network 
phase 2 + sewer system phase 
3 
Second empire and 
Troisième République 
Within Paris’s urban 
transformation  
1853-1925 Surface water treatment plants    Troisième République Mainly after 1878 
1886 - 1925 Water distribution network 
phase 3 + Sewer system phase 
4 + Waste water treatment 
through land farming 
Troisième République Especially after the 1894 tout-
à-l’égout  law 
Source : author’s elaboration 
Section 3 focuses on the Ourcq canal operation, section 4 deals with the water distribution 
networks until 1853 while Section 5 analyzes investments undertaken between 1853 and 
1925. For each kind of infrastructure we detail the financing scheme chosen and its 
implication. In section 6 we discuss the long-run cost allocation between the various 
stakeholders. For each “short run financing solution” who is the long run end payer?  
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To address such a key issue, it is essential to give great attention to the institutional 
management and ownership paths of the water services through the time. The main steps in 
the institutional history of Paris water service are summarized in the table below. The 
institutional choices made to build and operate water infrastructures in our time frame vary 
from full public provision under the Emperor’s will (Ourcq phase 1 - paragraph 3.1) to private 
concession for the canals (Ourcq phase 2 – paragraph 3.2 ) with a recurrent public-private 
debate on the opportunity to award a concession for water distribution or not (Box 2, 
paragraph 3.3 and section 4). The peculiar arrangement of a mixed scheme (Municipal 
department plus régie interessée with the Compagnie Générale des Eaux - CGE), which 
incredibly lasted for more than 120 years (1860 – 1984), is discussed in section 4.  
Table 2 : Main steps in the institutional history of the Paris water service, in grey the phases on which this 
paper is focused. 
Years Institutional phase 
Water 
production and 
transport 
Water 
distribution  Sanitation  Comments 
1807 - 1860 Pure municipal service  
Municipal 
department  
Municipal 
department 
(mainly through 
public fountains 
Not existing 
yet (but 
already 
drainage) 
Private concession on the 
Canal de l’Ourcq and 
canal Saint Martin 
1860 – 1984 Mixed scheme   Municipal department 
Municipal 
department + 
régie intéressée 
with the 
Compagnie 
Générale des 
Eaux (CGE) 
Municipal 
department, 
progressively 
with 
intermunicipal 
cooperation  
 
1985 – 1986   Transition scheme Municipal department  
Private 
companies CGE 
and Lyonnaise 
Municipal 
department + 
SIIAP at the 
intermunicipal 
scale  
 
1987 – 2009 Delegation scheme SAGEP (PPP) 
Private 
companies CGE 
and Lyonnaise 
Municipal 
department + 
SIIAP at the 
intermunicipal 
scale  
SAGEP (70 % of shares 
owned by the city of Paris 
and 28 % of the shares 
owned by CGE and 
Lyonnaise) 
After 2009 Municipalization Eau de Paris Eau de Paris 
Municipal 
department + 
SIIAP at the 
intermunicipal 
scale  
 
Source : author’s elaboration 
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3 The Paris canals : from public provision to concession and 
swinging back again 
3.1 Canal de l’Ourcq – phase 1 – Wine for water according to the 
Emperor’s will  
The purpose of the Ourcq canal project was not only to bring drinkable water to the city but 
also to allow navigation and transport of goods. The 29th Floréal an X (May 19th 1802) a law 
authorizing the project was passed after being approved by Napoléon Ier. A few months later, 
the 25th Thermidor an X (August 13th 1802), a decree established for the next ten years an 
additional levy of 1.25 franc per hectolitre of wine entering the city of Paris (droit d’octroi). 
Revenues from this levy were entirely allocated to the Ourcq canal project (Beaumont-Maillet 
1991, 142). 
Box 1 : The  French and Paris fiscal context in the 19th century 
At the national scale most of the national tax systems in Europe in the 19th century were still 
based mainly on indirect taxes with a strong redistributive effect in favour of capital owners 
and upper revenue classes (Ardant 1976). In France (and elsewhere in Europe too) it was only 
at the end of the 19th century that the switch from an indirect tax system towards an income 
tax took place together with a necessary shift towards a fairer and progressive9 tax allocation 
(Ardant 1976).  
At the municipal scale the droit d’octroi, a consumption tax on commodities entering a city, 
constituted in the 19th century the majority of municipal revenues in France and in other 
European countries (Ardant 1976). In Paris the droit d’octroi had been abolished after the 
Revolution in 1791 and established again in 1798 since no other replacement revenue could 
be found. It was then outlawed only in 1897. All along the 19th century indirect taxes provided 
on average more than two thirds of Paris’s municipal revenues (Cadoux 1900). 
Construction started as soon as in 1803 in order to satisfy Napoleon’s will, but was initially 
carried out very slowly due to a harsh conflict on various technicalities of the project between 
Pierre-Simon Girard, the chief engineer appointed by Napoleon I, and the Conseil Général 
                                                 
 
9 In fact a properly progressive income tax was introduced in France only after the First World War with the 
ideas from Joseph Caillaux. 
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des Ponts et Chaussées10. The rhythm of works sped up only after 1806 when an agreement 
was found on the project  (Girard 1804; Cebron de Lisle 1991, 134).  
Works were undertaken by various private contractors selected through bidding on unit price 
series (governmental decree of the 19 ventôse an XI – 10 march 1803). In 1806 nearly 1800 
workers were employed in the yards. Additional working force contributed to the project 
within the framework of “charity workshops” (growing from 100 people in 1805 to 900 in 
1806). In 1808 some war prisoners contributed too in order to make the water flow through 
the canal and reach the Bassin de la Villette allowing the celebration party in the Emperor’s 
honour (2 Décembre 1808). However, works had been undertaken in such a hurry and with 
low quality standards to satisfy the Emperor’s will that a few month later the Bassin de la 
Villette was again without water. Additional works had to be undertaken (Beaumont-Maillet 
1991, 143). 
Money coming from the additional droit d’octroi on wine was not sufficient to cover all the 
expenses, therefore the 21st March 1808 a decree enacted the sale of various navigation canals 
through France and allocated 3 million of francs of this sale to the Ourcq project (Beaumont-
Maillet 1991, 143).  
Notwithstanding this additional money, the city was struggling to cover the expenses, 
particularly the expropriation compensation fees which were increasing due to a windfall 
effect. Additional funding was needed. In 1810 the city was authorised to subscribe a 7 
million loan (decree of the 21st February 1810) to buy the parcels of land needed both for the 
canal and the water distribution network. In fact this loan was never subscribed (Massa-Gille 
1973). Works stopped in 1814 due to the undergoing events (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 135). 
In 1816, after the Restauration, a special commission of the Ponts et Chaussees wrote a 
progress and status report (Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées 1816) which gives an 
interesting snapshot of the executed works which had already absorbed 22 million of francs.   
This first phase of the Ourcq project appears to be essentially run by the Emperor’s will and 
authority to which the city institutions were subjected11. The funding came mainly from the 
                                                 
 
10 In fact Napoleon I  had appointed Girard with the mandate of achieving visible results as fast as possible 
(unachievable target of finishing the works by summer 1805) even if Girard had little experience about such a 
project and  therefore met the fierce opposition of the Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées. A recent book by 
Frédéric Graber (2009) analyze precisely such a debate and controversy. 
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additional droit d’octroi completed by other sources within the public budget. The precise 
repartition of the funding between the droit d’octroi and the other sources of funding is not 
clear on the basis of our sources.  
Most of the works had been executed by private entrepreneurs chosen through selective 
procurement, however “charity workers” and war prisoners were also involved in the 
construction. Indeed a rather handy in-kind grant.  
3.2 Canal de l’Ourcq – phase 2 – concession and borrowing : an in-
between  
The concession approach 
The second phase of the Ourcq canal project took place after Napoleon’s fall during the 
Borbonian Restauration, in years where the city of Paris had to face harsh financial 
constraints12.  
In this context, the prefect of Paris Gaspard de Chabrol adopted the policy of both slowing 
down the works rhythm to adapt to the available financial resources and of choosing public 
private partnerships for the larger investments including the second phase of the Ourcq canal.  
Indeed, inspired by the English example, the idea of involving private companies in bridging 
the financial gap for large investments started at that time to seduce many decision makers in 
Paris. That was the opinion of the Ponts et Chaussées commission on the Ourcq canal. 
According to the 1816 commission report (Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées 1816), up 
to 38 million francs and 10 years were still needed to complete the construction. The 
commission wanted to avoid the large time and cost overruns of the first phase. On the cost 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 Indeed between 1806 and 1815 three different budget were created for the city of Paris : the ordinary budget, 
the extraordinary budget and the special account for the Ourcq canal. Decision on the two latter budgets were 
taken by the “Conseil d’administration” chaired by the Emperor himself. The Paris City council (conseil 
municipal) was limited to the approval of the ordinary budget only, in fact with no real decision power (Cadoux 
1900, 15). 
12 It is useful to remind here some facts about the historical context of those years. During the troubled events of 
1814-1815, the city of Paris was occupied twice by foreign occupation armies and had to cover the heavy 
occupation charges (more than 5 M francs in 1814 and  more than 44 M F in 1815) (Massa-Gille 1973). 
Although the city had been authorised to borrow up to 12 M francs to cover those charges, the cost of money 
was so high in those years that borrowing was not a practicable solution. Finding additional municipal revenues, 
which were mainly based on consumption taxes such as the droit d’octroi, was not possible either due to the 
harsh 1816 corn crisis. The city had no other choice than issuing short term bonds – bons d’échéance. The 
reimbursement of these credits was very hard due to the lack of revenues and the city had to issue additional 
bons d’échéance in order to repay the expired bonds. At some point there were more than 27 M francs of short 
term bonds issued by the city of Paris in circulation – “the city had practically minted money”. The financial 
constraints which the city of Paris had to face where tight even after the 1817 borrowing of 31 M francs (loan 
duration of 10 years) (Massa-Gille 1973) 
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side, the noticed overrun in expropriation compensation-costs due to windfall effect was a 
particularly sensitive issue. On this base the commission strongly recommended the city to 
adopt a concession approach13 selecting a private company to be involved in the funding and 
execution of the forthcoming phase of the project.  
The awarding of the first concession in 1818  - Ourcq and Saint Denis canal 
Two companies answered the call for tenders for the completion of the Ourcq and Saint Denis 
canals and for the execution of the canal Saint Martin. However, one of them was excluded 
because its offer was based on the use of English cast iron, which was unacceptable for a 
government which was sensible to the lobby of the French iron industry.  
Box 2 : The case of the Compagnie des Eaux de Paris (1778-1788)  
Concession schemes had already been set up in the past in the French context but for much 
smaller investments. The case of the Compagnie des Eaux de Paris created in 1778 by the 
Périer brothers is a well known example of such a scheme. At that time the “private service” 
consisting in bringing water “à l’étage” (upstairs) was considered a luxury by French 
authorities whose main concern was to deliver water nearly for free at public fountains. Thus 
the Compagnie des Eaux de Paris was given a 15 years concession for supplying 3000 m3 of 
water per day and distributing it both at public fountains and à l’étage in apartment buildings. 
To achieve its objective the company had to invest in steam engines to elevate and deliver the 
Seine water. The company did not last very long: it went bankrupt in 1788 and its assets 
became property of the royal treasury. Why did this company fail? One possible reason is that 
the company had the duty of selling and delivering water to public fountains and it was not 
compulsory for small users to subscribe to the upstairs service which was the only one to be 
profitable for the company (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 85; Bezançon 1999, 87).  
A contract was signed with the compagnie Vassal et Saint Didier which was founded in 1818. 
The company had to finance the completion of the Ourcq and Saint Denis canals and received 
                                                 
 
13 The approach was mainly financial as the works had to be executed under public authorities control : the city 
borrows some capital from a private financial company which gets the money through the emission of shares. 
The paying off of the capital is leant against the revenues coming from the canal which are given to the company 
while the interests are covered by annual payments from the city (Gille 1965, 203 quoted in; Massa-Gille 1973, 
135). Indeed the Ponts et Chausées engineers wished to keep the control on the works undertaken. As a fact, 19th 
century canals in France were more frequently realized on a “Soumission” agreement basis rather than a full 
“concession”(Nieradzik 2007). The Paris canal case however does not fully fit in the “concession” model or in 
the “Soumission” one and is somehow in between. Nevertheless, in this paper we will refer to it as a 
“concession”. 
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in turn the revenues from the navigation traffic through a 99 years concession plus a 7.5 M 
francs initial grant to be paid by the government. The Saint Martin canal and the distribution 
network for the Ourcq water were at first excluded from the concession but the company 
agreed to submit a similar offer for the canal Saint Martin afterwards. 
However only 0.5 M francs had to be paid cash to the company while the other 7 M francs 
would be paid through bons d’échéances (time drafts). In fact with such a mechanism the 
company was both investing in the concession and lending money to the city by accepting to 
receive the grant later in time. The agreement was approved by the Paris city council the 24th 
April 1818 and some time later by the parliament to comply with the 1818 law which 
subjected any borrowing made by cities to an approval by the parliament. A strong debate 
took place in the parliament on the pros and cons of such an agreement: a penalizing offer 
obtained through insufficient competition according to the MP Delessert, a very good offer on 
the contrary according to the Ponts et Chaussées director Becquey which pointed out that the 
Ourcq canal part of the project would provide nearly no revenues at all to the company. 
According to Becquey the revenues would come only from the Canal Saint Denis and could 
be estimated in 300 000 francs, corresponding to a 5% rate of return. Finally the parliament 
authorised the city of Paris to borrow 7 M francs according to the terms of the agreement 
which are summarised in the table below. The city would pay off the 7 M of bons d’échéance 
with the revenues coming from the additional droit d’octroi on wine (refer also to Box 1 for 
comments on municipal fiscal resources). 
Table 3 : 1818 Ourcq concession agreement 
Duration of the concession 99 years 
Contribution of the city 7.5 M francs grant   
land purchase and expropriation compensation costs  
Starting of the works Before the 01 January 1819 
End of the works Before the 31 December 1822 
“Grant” characteristics 0.5 M francs paid cash  
7 M paid through time drafts – bons d’échéance issued according to the works rhythm 
7.5 % interest rate on the bond part  
Grace period until the end of the works (payoff to start after the 01/01/1823) 
Source : author’s elaboration 
The awarding of the second concession in 1821 - Canal Saint-Martin 
A rather striking peculiarity of the concession awarding in 1818 is the fact that two different 
tasks were assigned to the company : a) the achievement of works to be financed both through 
a public grant and through the company equity b) a 7 M francs credit awarded by the 
company to the city. The law of the 5th of August 1821 asked to modify the awarding 
mechanism to be used for canals concessions in France. The awarding procedure had to be 
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split in two separate tenders: a first one for the selection of a company for the concession 
including the execution of the works, which were technically specified by the public 
autorities, (competition based on the minimum grant asked), a second one for the selection of 
a financial partner who would lend money to the city. The purpose of this two-fold approach 
was to put larger competition in particular in the borrowing conditions to obtain better terms 
for the city. 
Through the first tender the Compagnie des Canaux de Paris (former Compagnie Vassal and 
Saint Didier) was awarded the concession for the Saint Martin canal on the basis of a city 
grant of 5 470 000 francs. 
A second competition took place to obtain a 8 M francs nominal credit which had been 
authorized by the government (400 000 francs of annuity at 5% interest rate). The tender was 
held at very similar conditions as the emission of state bonds. Twenty one companies 
answered to the bid based on the lowest emission discount over the nominal value.  The city 
obtained 7 924 000 francs against a nominal capital value of 8 M francs14 (refer also to Table 
6).  These funds were supposed to cover both the payment of the grant to the Compagnie des 
Canaux de Paris and the land purchase and expropriation compensation costs (which in fact 
grew up quite fast above the estimated amounts). 
3.3 Canal de l’Ourcq and canal Saint Martin : from concession to public 
ownership 
We have already pointed out that a harsh debate took place in the parliament in 1818 on the 
pros and cons of the concession approach. The debate on the best institutional solution for the 
Paris canals management came back in the 1860’s when the city decided to realize the 
Boulevard Richard Lenoir above the Saint Martin Canal in order to stop splitting up in two 
parts this area of the city. The public interest was then in conflict with the company which 
argued that the roofing of the canal was prejudicial to her interest. The city ended up buying 
back the concession of the Saint Martin Canal to the company in 1861 (Humblot 1885). 
                                                 
 
14 The poorest offer was at 93.55 (Lefebvre) while the winning one was at 99.05 (G. Odier). This was a low and 
interesting emission discount since the same year French state bonds were emitted at discount value of 89.55. 
The funds had to be paid to the city through in 8 payments between July 1822 and April 1824. The payback time 
was of 27.5 years. The effective interest rate is of 5.5 % (Gallais-Hamonno 2007, 267). 
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Another similar conflict took place during the important drought period of 1875. According to 
the 1818 agreement the company had to deliver to the city 80 000 m3 of water per day. 
During the drought the city wanted to allow people to draw additional water from the canal 
while the company had rented the canal bank to private workshops and small factories which 
needed the hydraulic force of the flow. Once again the public interest was in conflict with the 
company’s profitability. Again, the city decided to reclaim the ownership of the Ourcq and 
Saint Denis canals. 
These two early terminations of the contract implied the payment of an annual installment by 
the city to the company until 1922 as a compensation for the lost revenues. The compensation 
annuities agreed was of 180 000 francs for the Saint Martin Canal (plus an indemnity una 
tantum of 1 338 800 francs) and of 540 000 francs for the Ourcq and Saint Denis canals 
(Humblot 1885). 
In his report of 1885, Mr Humblot, which was the Ingénieur en chef des Ponts et Chaussées in 
charge of the service des canaux et de l’assainissement de Paris, appears to be very critical on 
the choice of the concession which had been made. He shows some figures in order to 
demonstrate the excessive-profit which in his opinion had been made by the Compagnie des 
Canaux de Paris and argues that surely the city of Paris could have found a loan in 1823 to a 
much better interest rate with the advantage of avoiding the conflicts and transaction costs of 
1861 and 1876 which had been very high according to his view. 
Table 4 : Cost estimation for the Ourcq canal, comparison of various data sources 
 
Estimations in French Francs, nominal amounts Belgrand Martin Saint-Leon et 
Cadoux 
Humblot 
1 Ourcq ante 1816 13 578 177   
2 Ourcq post 1816 9 973 150   
3 Saint Denis 2 992000   
4 Saint Martin 8 347 240   
5 Gare Arsenal 3 569 759   
6 Total post 1816 (2+3+4+5) 24 882 149 31 391 753  
7 Total expenses (1+2+3+4+5) 38 460 326 49 448 000  
8 Gross total expenses 1818 agreement (2+3) 12 965 150   
9 Gross total expenses 1821 agreement (4+5) 11 916 999   
10 grant 1818 agreement 7 500 000   
11 grant 1821 agreement 5 470 000   
12 Net expenses supported by the company 1818 (8-10) 5 465 150  3 922 650 
13 Net expenses supported by the company 1821 (9-11) 6 446 999  2 831 310 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Belgrand (1873), Martin Saint-Léon (1843) and (1885), quoted by 
Cebron de L’isle (1991, 139–140) 
On the contrary G. Massa-Gille (1973) points out the harsh financial constraints of the city of 
Paris in 1818 and 1821 when the agreements were made. The city had nearly “no credit” at all 
in the financial circles at that time. And if the estimation of 300 000 francs of expected 
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revenues from the Saint Denis canal was correct, the profitability that the company would get 
on its net expenses would hardly exceed 5%. Not only it is not the purpose of our work to 
judge the historical choices which had been made but there are also so different and 
incoherent figures available on the costs of the three canals (refer to Table 4); so a large 
uncertainty surrounds them and makes an objective analysis almost impossible. 
4 Water distribution network for the city: the temptation of the 
concession approach 1806-1853 
As already mentioned, although the revenues would come from the navigation tariffs, the 
main purpose of the Ourcq canal system was to bring additional water for the needs of the city 
(les eaux nouvelles as opposed to les eaux anciennes which were at that time mainly the Seine 
water pumped through steam engines, some wells and the Medicis Arcueil aqueduct). Indeed 
the idea behind the project was to bring larger quantities of water to the city for supplying 
public needs such as street washing and fire fighting, as in the water in quantity paradigm 
(Barraqué 2003b; Barraqué, Britto, and Formiga Johnsson).  
With the decree of the 4th of September 1807 the ownership and management of all the water 
supply in Paris was transferred from the state to the municipal administration (Prefet de la 
Seine) both concerning the eaux nouvelles and the eaux anciennes. However the state 
administration kept exerting a strong supervision on it through the Directeur Général des 
Ponts et Chaussées and the Ministre de l’intérieur. Indeed during the Empire, the emperor 
exerted a very close control over the municipal administration and water supply was still 
considered an emperor’s gift which would contribute to the city’s splendour and to 
Napoleon’s glory (Cebron de Lisle 1991). 
Even if the Ourcq’s water already reached the fontaine des Innocents on August 15th 1809, the 
city had to wait some more time to get a proper water distribution network. It is well shown in 
Table 5 that the realization of the water supply network was slow. Indeed, the network 
completed by 1832 was still largely insufficient to deliver the whole 80 000 m3 per day that 
the Ourcq canal was supposed to supply. 
Three ambitious projects (Projet Girard, Projet Mallet, Projet Genieys) were drafted for the 
Ourcq water distribution network. Quite soon however suspicions arose on the real quality of 
the Ourcq water in parallel with the concept of realizing two separate distribution networks : 
one for the residential drinking water delivered à l’etage (Seine water) and one for the public 
fountains and other needs (Ourcq water) (Cebron de Lisle 1991). 
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The various projects estimated the financial needs between 31 M francs (Projet Mallet) and 
18.7 M francs (Projet Genieys). Due to the huge amounts of money needed, the city was 
tempted for a long time to award a concession on water distribution to a private company 
which could obtain more easily the financial resources needed. However the concession had 
also many opponents and the debate on whether it was the right approach or not was fierce.  
The memory of the failure of the Compagnie des Eaux de Paris in 1788 (refer to Box 2) was 
an argument against the concession. Furthermore, awarding such a concession was not an 
easy task due to the conflicting interest between the city (which wanted the company to 
deliver for free at public fountains) and the company (whose revenues and profitability would 
depend on a sufficient number of private subscriptions). The financial constraints of the city, 
the hesitation between the various projects and the debate on the opportunity of a concession 
approach slowed down the extension of the water network ; until 1830 works were undertaken 
only with minor ordinary funds taken on the annual city’s budget surplus. 
Table 5 : Water and sewer system lengths (1806-1930) 
Year Water network length (km) Sewer system length15 (km) 
1806  24 
1823  33 
1832 39 (Ourcq network) 40 
1840 312 110 
1849  121 
1855 364 (in 1854) 163 
1860 465 230 
1874 1374  
1880 1527 619  
1885 1979 833 
1890 2125 899 
1895 2289 987 
1900 2533 1090 
1905 2632 1173 
1910 2745 1204 
1913 2796 1225 
1915 2800 1230 
1920 2823 1233  
1930 2867 1303 
Source : Authors elaboration, inspired from various sources (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 247, 424, 559; Lemarchand 
1914, 164; Lemarchand 1923, 274) and from Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris, various years 
Even if the Paris water distribution concession failed to be awarded in the end, it is rather 
interesting to point out and analyze the main attempts to initiate it made by the city of Paris in 
the first half of the 19th century. 
                                                 
 
15 Except sewer building connections 
  
16
A negotiation with the company of the English brothers Lees started in 1814 and was in its 
final step in 1817 when the government rejected the principle of a settling through a simple 
mutual agreement intuitu personae and required a transparent and competitive bid (Mallet 
1830). In order to get some benchmarking on how to draft the technical specifications of such 
a tender Mr Mallet led a mission in 1824 to England and particularly to London where private 
companies already had concessions on water distribution (Chatzis 2010). 
A competitive bid was then launched in 1829 according to the following terms  : i) a 99 years 
concession of all the existing Paris water infrastructure currently managed by the city with an 
exclusive right of installing and exploiting underground water distribution pipes, ii)obligation 
to complete and maintain the infrastructures needed to deliver the Ourcq’s water to the public 
fountains, iii)execution and maintenance of the infrastructure needed to distribute Seine water, 
iii)a free delivery to the city of a fixed amount of Seine water to supply some public 
fountains, iv) a price cap on water subscription fees for domestic use and v) payment of a 
annual royalty equivalent to one tenth of the gross revenue from sold water. No offers were 
received for that bid. The main cause of the failure was probably the obligation made to the 
company to  complete and maintain the unprofitable Ourcq water network to supply the 
public fountains on which no revenues could be expected (Cebron de Lisle 1991). 
With the new Paris administration, led by prefect Rambuteau, further attempts were made to 
award a concession to a private company. New specifications were drafted and approved by 
the municipal council in 1834. Learning from the 1830 tender failure, the city had chosen to 
limit the concession to the distribution of Seine water on which a private company could 
expect to get some revenues, leaving the completion of the Ourcq public fountains network to 
the city’s initiative. However the Conseil Général des Ponts et Chaussées never approved 
these specifications and suggested in 1836 to concede the water distribution service to the 
Lees company through a simple mutual agreement. It was asked to the Lees company a 2 M 
francs deposit to guarantee their offer. They preferred to withdraw their offer (Beaumont-
Maillet 1991). Once again the attempt to award a concession failed. 
The concession temptation however came back once more in 1852-1853 under the Second 
empire. The city launched again a call for tender for a concession of the water service. Five 
offers were received including one of the Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) whose 
creation had been led by the very influent Comte Siméon. Napoleon III had nearly chosen to 
award the concession to the CGE when the new prefect of Paris, Baron Haussmann managed 
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to convince the Emperor to stop that process in order to maintain the city’s control on water 
supply.  
In fact Haussmann’s opposition to the concession scheme was based on strategic technical 
choices rather than on any judgment on the best institutional framework. Assisted by Eugène 
Belgrand, the chief engineer he had appointed, Haussmann had the intuition which would be 
later confirmed by Koch and Pasteur’s scientific discoveries, that all the water containing 
organic matter in dissolution (such as in the Seine and Ourcq) should not be considered 
drinkable. Haussmann and Belgrand were then convinced of the necessity of bringing distant 
and clean water to the city from far away sources and were therefore opposed to the 
mainstream idea of pumping more water from the Seine as the CGE or another company 
would have done if they had been awarded the concession.  
In the meantime in the suburbs, outside Paris administrative boundaries, various concessions 
had been awarded since the 1820’s to various private companies delivering Seine water 
elevated through steam pumps. By 1859, the CGE had bought all the previous existing 
companies and was responsible of the water service in 26 municipalities in the Paris suburbs 
through concession contracts. In June 1859 however, the annexation of many suburbs 
municipalities to the capital city took place (Figure 1). A solution had to be found concerning 
CGE’s rights in the formerly independent areas of the new Paris. The 50 years legal 
agreement of 1860 between the city of Paris and CGE consisted both in a “municipalization 
and a (partial) privatization” (Bocquet, Chatzis, and Sander 2008) : a) the Paris municipal 
service acquired the entire water infrastructure of the formerly autonomous municipalities 
from CGE16 ; b) CGE was not awarded a full concession but only a régie interessée contract 
according to which the company was responsible for commercializing water, handling 
relations with subscribers, and billing and collecting payments on behalf of the city. CGE kept 
however the full management of various water services outside Paris new administrative 
boundaries17 (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 387). 
                                                 
 
16 The city’s agreed to pay a 50 years long annual royalty of 1 600 000 F to CGE  until 1910 (Morizet 1932, 
329). 
17 The CGE activities in the suburbs expanded even more after the 1867 amendment to the 1860 contract : the 
City of Paris withdrew from all the water supply contracts with neighbouring suburbs and left CGE totally free 
to expand its activity as a concessionaire ouside Paris administrative boundaries (Bocquet, Chatzis, and Sander 
2008). 
  
18
5 The increasing trend to finance investments through debt 
After a quick retrospective glimpse on the first half of the 19th century (paragraph 5.1), this 
section is focused on investments undertaken in the 1852-1925 time frame. Paragraph 5.2 
sketch the new borrowing policy. Paragraph 5.3 analyzes deeply financing tools used during 
Haussmann’s urban transformative of Paris. Paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 summarize the major 
water and sanitation infrastructure undertaken in those 75 years. Paragraph 5.6 details the 
financing policy for such an ambitious investment plan. Last paragraph (5.7) gives some 
concluding remarks on the key role played by long term debt. 
5.1 A cautious attitude until 1850 
During the Empire and the Restauration the city was generally reluctant to borrow (only 5 
loans were issued before 1850 as shown in Table 6) and rather adopted the cautious attitude of 
financing investments either on the surplus of the ordinary budget or through the concession 
approach by giving up future revenues to the concessionaire. 
Table 6 : Loan issued by the city of Paris in the 19th century 
 
Year of 
issue 
Capital Interest rate Annual 
lots 
KF 
 
Duration 
 
Payement 
duration 
 
Main scopes 
 
collected 
MF 
nominal 
MF 
coupon 
% 
effective 
% 
1817 31 33 6.0 9.86 240 to 
888.88 
12 19 terms 
over 18 
months 
 
1815-
1822 
2.57 4.24    5.0 10.48 -  1 term  
1832 40 40 4.0 7.91 112 20 5 terms over 
5 months 
Consolidation 
1849 27.63 25 5.0 4.53 198 10 unknown Budgetary deficits of the 
1846 to 1850 years 
1852 61.39 50 5.0 3.71 336 19 unknown 1er réseau - Public works 
(Les Halles and rue de 
Rivoli ) 
1855 60 75 3.0 5.07 300 42 7 terms over 
18 months 
1er réseau - Public works, 
rue de Rivoli. bd 
Sébastopol. av. Victoria 
1857 50 57.3 4.0 5.10 125 31.5 5 terms over 
16 months 
Caisse de la Boulangerie 
(bakery basket fund) 
1860 136.62 143.8 3.0 4.0 300 37 9 terms over 
27 months 
2ème réseau - Public 
works, including Dhuis 
adduction and water and 
sewer systems 
1865 270 300 4.0 5.09 1 140 63.5 8 terms over 
4 years 
Publ. works (annexation 
expenses), incl. Vanne 
adduction and water and 
sewer systems 
1869 260 300.5 3.0 4.47 1 000 40 4 terms over 
1 year 
Payback to the Crédit 
foncier of  the bons de 
délégation 
Source: author’s adaptation from Gallais-Hamonno (2007, Electronic Annex II ). In grey  loans on which water 
infrastructures were partly financed. 
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As early as in the 1820’s a debate took place between the city decision makers (Massa-Gille 
1973): on one side the “cautious approach” suggested both to slow down the works and to 
find some surplus in the city’s budget to fund them on. On the contrary the “gambling 
approach” implied to borrow in order to accelerate the rhythm of works which would 
contribute to increase the city’s revenues and allow to payback the loan. Let us keep in mind 
that the borrowed amounts represented only 10% of the total revenues of the city during the 
Restauration and only 7.5% between 1821 and 1830 showing a cautious borrowing policy 
(Massa-Gille 1973). 
5.2 The turning point in the city’s borrowing policy  
The approach changed with the new régime led by Napoleon III who wished to quickly 
undertake urban renovation, complete infrastructures and obtain visible results in order to 
build a new Paris and consolidate his power. A tension arose on the borrowing issue between 
prefect Jean-Jacques Berger and minister Persigny which was in favour of borrowing large 
amounts of money in order to accelerate the rhythm of the works. Berger was reluctant to 
borrow and had instead a cautious financial strategy which consisted in making up the 
provisional city’s budget in order to show larger expenses and lower revenues and to secretly 
expect to get an important surplus at the end of the year. In fact this had been also the strategy 
of the previous prefect Rambuteau in order to get more funds for Paris approved by the 
parliament where the MPs coming from other geographical regions were often reluctant to 
allocate funds to the capital city.  
Figure 1 : Administrative boundaries of Paris before / after 1860 
 
Source : Bocquet, Chatzis and Sander (2008) 
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Against his own opinion, Berger had to accept the undertaking of some large urban renovation 
works (new streets next to the Louvre, creation of the Boulevard de Strasbourg) financed 
through a 50 M francs loan (subscribed in 1852 by the city) whose payoff was still covered by 
the additional droit d’octroi on wine which had been extended until 1870. Persigny however 
wanted to borrow even more. In his opinion a new loan could be issued and guaranteed by the 
annual surplus of the city’s budget which was significant in those years thanks to the upturn in 
the economy and also to the cautious financial policy of the previous years. In fact, Persigny’s 
strategy aimed at using the funds borrowed to buy land which would be sold later to a 
building contractor with a capital gain for the city (due to the urban renovation of the area) 
which would allow to payback the loan and invest in another similar operation (we will give 
more details on these land value capture financing schemes in the next paragraph).  That was 
too much for Berger who “did not accept to ruin the city and to burden with debt the future 
generation”18. Berger resigned and was replaced by Haussmann with the clear mandate of 
modernizing the city of Paris from a “congested medieval city into a dynamic metropolis”19 . 
In Haussmann’s view a modern city needed improved circulations not only of people and 
commodities but also air, water and even money. Haussmann initiated a urban renovation of 
Paris based on new enlarged boulevards including a modern water supply network and 
sewers.  
5.3 Haussmann : reshaping the city by all means (1852 -1869) 
The transformation of Paris 
The huge investments undertaken by Haussmann between 1852 and 1869 aimed at shaping a 
brand new city with large boulevards and new modern buildings in the framework of a 
“centrally directed public investment”20 strategy based on the Saint-Simonian ideas of the 
“productive expenses”21. To comply with Napoleon III’s will, Haussmann gave an 
exaggerated rhythm to Paris urban renovation works not hesitating to borrow more and more  
in a sort of self-powered vicious circle.  
                                                 
 
18 Cebron de Lisle (1991) 
19 Gandy (1999, 27) 
20 Gandy (1999, 28) 
21 The théorie des dépenses productives  can be summarized by the following sentence by Saint-Simon (1760-
1825)  quoted by Marchand (2011) « in a stable régime, investments become productive ». Saint-Simonian ideas 
“played a significant role in the development of new political and economic ideas, which  reflected the growing  
influence  of  industrialists and scientists in nineteenth-century France […] and proved highly influential within 
the French engineering profession.” (Gandy 1999, footnote 31) 
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A great amount of literature already exists on Haussmann’s transformation of Paris and going 
deeply into that issue is far beyond this paper’s scope. Thus, we will only give a few figures 
to remember the extent of the changes which took place in that historical phase.  Between 
1852 and 1868 more than half of Paris buildings were demolished (18 000 buildings 
demolished on a total of 30 770 buildings in Paris at that time). 60 % of Paris’s surface was 
transformed over 17 years (Marchand 2011). Undertaken investments over 17 years add up to 
a total of  2.5 billions francs22 (Marchand 2011) and are summarized in the table below.  
Table 7 : Urban investments in Haussmann’s mandate (1853-1869 
 Amount (francs, nominal value) 
Urban renovation operations 1 400 000 000 
Other investments associated to urban renovation operations  : 
        -Public buildings 
        -water and sanitation systems 
        -tree-lined walkways 
   700 000 000 
       (284 000 000) 
       (153 000 000) 
       (177 000 000) 
Concession compensation costs 
-Compagnie Générale des Eaux 
-canal Saint Martin and Saint Maur 
-abattoirs 
-compagnie des petites voitures 
      90 000 000 
Debt service burden associated to investments previously undertaken      145 000 000 
Debt service burden associated to Haussmann’s investments       200 000 000 
Total    2 535 000 000 
Source : author’s elaboration, based on Morizet (1932, 282) and Haussmann(2000, II – 337–340 original 
numbers) 
Although water and sanitation investments were essential for the development of Paris, their 
153 M francs amounts are small if compared to the total 2.5 billion francs. An analysis of 
water and sanitation investments in those years would be incomplete without looking at the 
global picture of the massive urban transformation which took place. 
Infrastructure financing scheme 
Three infrastructure financing schemes were adopted by Haussmann  (Massa-Gille 1973). We 
will shortly describe them in this paragraph before going back to their implication in water 
infrastructures financing in paragraph 5.6.  
The first financing tool consisted in traditional borrowing through issuing municipal bonds (as 
the ones listed in Table 6 above). The second one, the Caisse des travaux (established through 
the decree of November 14th 1858), was an integrated financing scheme for urban renovation, 
which consisted in a revolving short term basket fund which was initially funded by the city 
with 20 M francs. The idea of this fund (shown in the below scheme) was to bridge the 
                                                 
 
22 That amount represented roughly the total annual budget of the French state at that time (2 billion francs) 
(Marchand 2011). 
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expenses to be paid at the beginning of an urban renovation operation (land purchase and 
expropriation, works) and the funds to be obtained later (government transfers23, fiscal 
resources from the city’s budget surplus and revenues from land selling). Resources of the 
Caisse des travaux came from the initial capitalization made by the city and through the 
emission of short term credit certificates (bons de caisse). Cautiously the parliament put a cap 
of 100 M francs24 on the amount which could be borrowed through the Caisse des travaux. 
Figure 2 : The Caisse des travaux institutional scheme 
Source : author’s elaboration 
Despite the large borrowing amounts which were issued mainly through municipal bonds 
(Table 6), funds were still short to cover all the works at the rhythm planned by Haussmann. 
A third financing scheme, similar to Persigny’s initial idea, started – les bons de delegations : 
in that scheme the city gave a concession to a contractor for expropriating and acquiring some 
areas, demolishing the old buildings and streets, realizing the new Boulevard, giving it back to 
the city and finally selling either the land or the new buildings (refer to the Figure 3 below). 
The city would pay a grant (partially covered by the government through the subvention de 
pavage) to the contractor linked with the value of the renovated street. In fact the grant would 
                                                 
 
23 The so called “subvention de pavage”. 
24 Initially the approved cap was of only 30 M francs but under political pressure it was later extended to 100 M 
francs (Massa-Gille 1973, 252) 
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be paid cash to the contractor by a bank (taken a fee on it) on the basis of the city’s guarantee. 
The contractor would anticipate the funds both for the land purchase expropriation costs and 
for the works while it would get its profitability from the property value capital gain at the end 
of the whole operation. The city had found a way to borrow both from the contractor (the land 
purchase/expropriation and works costs) and from the bank (the credit given in advance on 
the grant to be paid). The contractor’s funds could come from his equity but were very often 
borrowed from banks which would be the major lenders. In fact very often the banks would 
enter in the capital of the contractor’s company in order to get a share of the expected capital 
gain. The banks themselves, and particularly the Crédit Foncier25 which had been established 
by the government in 1852, were collecting money through their own bond emission. 
Expropriation rules, procurement and risk allocation 
In all the administrative documents of that time the urban renovation operations undertaken 
by Haussmann are classified in 3 groups (“les trois réseaux”) according to the importance of 
the government’s grant in the financing scheme. Some data on the three urban transformation 
phases are summarized in the table below. The first works, le premier réseau launched at the 
beginning of the Second Empire was strongly subsidized by the government since the 
parliament did not dare to oppose to the emperor. Later MP’s from rural areas progressively 
curbed down all attempts to subsidize the capital city (Morizet 1932, 202). As a consequence, 
the second phase of works was less subsidized and the third one, le troisième réseau, was not 
subsidized at all by the government.  As the works went on, not only subsidies decreased but 
also opposition to municipal borrowing rose progressively. Indeed while the 1855 and 1860 
loans were easily voted by the Parliament, approval for the 1865 loan was obtained narrowly 
(Moncan and Heurteux 2002; quoted by Marchand 2011). Regarding the1869 consolidation 
loan with the Crédit Foncier, opposition to its approval was so fierce than it implied 
Haussmann’s power loss and lead sometimes later to his fall (Morizet 1932, 299). Works 
within the troisième réseau started under Haussmann’s mandate, lasted mainly until 1880 but 
were not fully completed  until 1905.  
Within the Premier réseau, financed by the 1852 and 1855 loan (Table 6) works were mainly 
undertaken in-house (en régie) by the municipality with only minor works contracted out to 
                                                 
 
25 Indeed, the Crédit Foncier played a key role in the financing of Paris municipal infrastructure both in the 
framework of  Haussmann’s Bons de Délégation and afterwards since it was one of the few financial institutions 
authorized to lend money to French municipalities. 
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private companies26. On the contrary urban renovation operations within the deuxième réseau 
and even more within the troisième réseau were mostly undertaken by selected private 
contractors. 
Table 8 : Main data on the three phases of Paris urban transformation (1852-1880)  
Operation Time frame Main purpose Length 
(km) 
Costs 
(MF) 
Financing tools 
1er réseau  1851-1857 
Already sketched in 
1793 
 
Rue de Rivoli 
Bd St Michel – Bd 
Sebastopol 
9.5 272 121 MF on the 1852 and 1855 
loans. 
Governmental subsidy of 
roughly 93 MF27 
2ème réseau 1858-1868 Connecting the city 
centre with the 
outlying districts 
27 410 50 MF government subsidy  
1865 loan 
3ème réseau Main phase until 1880.  
Last operation in 1905 
(Bd Raspail) 
 
New streets incl. in 
the new districts after 
the annexation. 
64.5 300 No governmental subsidy 
Source : author’s elaboration, inspired from Marchand (2011) 
Figure 3 : the Bons de délégations institutional scheme 
Source : author’s elaboration 
Within these urban renovation operations, entire buildings, streets and areas were renovated 
including refurbished streets and modern networks such as water, sanitation and gas street 
                                                 
 
26 Sociéte Ardoin et Ricardo involved in the Boulevard de Strasbourg ; Société Immobilière involved in a part of 
the Rue de Rivoli and in the Boulevard Malesherbes operation  (Morizet 1932, 287).  
27 Morizet (1932, 202) 
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lighting (Morizet 1932, 287). Costs of these public infrastructure were initially covered by the 
contractor and paid back later by selling the land or the buildings with a higher market value.  
We will jointly refer to the Caisse des travaux and Bons de delegations as “Integrated Urban 
Development” mechanisms. A key legal instrument allowing the implementation of these two 
schemes was the 1852 decree on expropriation rules (decret loi du 26 mars 1852) which had 
been issued by the government. The previous law of 1841 already authorized the 
expropriation of buildings and land on the layout of the new streets. Nevertheless the 1852 
decree was much more powerful28 since, on the grounds of the fight against insalubrity, it 
authorized to expropriate also all the properties impacted even marginally by the planned 
works29. Doing so, the city could expropriate a much larger area and capture a greater part of 
the capital gain on land value when selling  it at the end of the renovation operation. However, 
after 1858, land owners consistently appealed against the expropriation acts and their 
positions prevailed most of the time in the judgements of the Conseil d’Etat. After 1858 
properties could be expropriated less easily and had instead to be bought at increasingly high 
market value. Even when the expropriation went on, according to the Conseil d’Etat 
jurisprudence,  the city had to give back to the previous owners any part of the properties un-
impacted by the works  (Marchand 2011).  As a consequence a larger part of added property 
value escaped from the city’s control. Furthermore, due to a 1858 decree (December 27th 
1858), in the framework of an expropriation, the city had to pay an indemnity not only to the 
owners but to the tenant too. Obtaining the land for the urban renovation operation became 
increasingly costly.  
Depending on the financing tool chosen and on the entity responsible of the works and 
expropriation various allocations of risks were taking place (Table 9 below). In fact each 
operation consisted in both an urban renovation and a borrowing with respectively an 
operational and financial risk associated. On one hand the operational risk (cost overrun on 
works, complexity and costs overrun in the expropriation procedure) was taken either by the 
city (in-house responsibility of the expropriation and works) or by the contractor. On the other 
hand the financial risk was taken by the lenders which were municipal bond’s subscribers, 
                                                 
 
28 André Morizet defines the 1852 decree as un instrument précieux (Morizet 1932, 182) 
29 Decret Loi du 26 mars 1852 : "Dans tout projet d'expropriation pour l'élargissement, le redressement ou la 
formation des rues de Paris, l'Administration aura la faculté  de  comprendre la totalité des immeubles atteints, 
lorsqu’elle jugera que les parties restantes  ne sont pas d’une étendue ou d’une forme qui permette d’y élever 
des constructions salubres", quoted by Faure (2004, 12) 
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bons de caisse’s subscribers or banks in the case of the bons de delegations. In this latter case 
the ultimate lenders were however the individual bank’s bonds’s subscribers which were 
taking the risk associated to the bank’s financial soundness.  
As the expropriation procedures were eased with the adoption of the 1852 decree, the 
operational risk perceived by private contractors decreased and they engaged themselves more 
frequently in those urban renovation operations (Morizet 1932, 287). After 1858 the 
operational risk increased back again as the expropriation went less smoothly. As a 
consequence urban renovation’s costs went up and their rhythm kept slowing down also due 
to the city’s growing financial constraints which lead to Haussmann’s decline and fall in 1870 
(Marchand 2011).  
Table 9 : Risk allocation according to the financing scheme 
Financing tool Entity responsible of the 
works and expropriation 
Operational risk Financial risk 
Municipal bond Contractor Contractor Lenders (municipal bond 
suscribers) City (in-house) City 
    
Caisse travaux Contractor Contractor Lenders (bons de caisse 
subscribers) City (in-house) City 
    
Bons de délégation Contractor Contractor 
Bank (equity or debt) + 
subscribers of bank’s bonds   
Source : author’s elaboration 
The slippery grounds of borrowing  
The integrated urban development financial schemes adopted by Haussmann, especially the 
Bons de delegation, were very controversial since in many opponents’ view they consisted in 
hidden loans adopted to bypass the borrowing cap imposed by the parliament. Suspicions on 
the legality of these schemes progressively grew up in the 1860’s (Morizet 1932, 288) but 
Haussmann’s was at first protected in high places. Meanwhile, financial needs to cover urban 
operation costs were constantly increasing. Furthermore, as most of the Bons de delegations 
were in the hand of the Crédit Foncier, its financial soundness was in precarious equilibrium. 
A debt consolidation agreement between the city and the Credit Foncier was needed to extend 
the debt’s maturity: it required an official approval. The debate was harsh as shown in the 
famous pamphlet “Les Comptes fantastiques d’Haussmann” by Jules Ferry (1868) accusing 
Haussmann to put abusively the city into a massive debt which shall weight on the next 
generations. Although the consolidation loan was approved in 1969 (Table 6), in turn 
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Haussmann lost most of his power and prestige and fell a few months later on January the 5th 
1870. 
To summarize, in Haussmann’s era the city of Paris borrowed massively to finance its urban 
development (including water and sanitation infrastructures). Not only large loans were 
subscribed through municipal bonds but two other financing schemes based on land value 
capture were experienced to bypass the borrowing cap imposed by the parliament. The next 
two paragraphs will sketch the main investments brought to completion concerning water and 
sanitation while paragraph 5.6 will detail which financing tools used to undertake those 
investments. 
5.4 Investments in water and sanitation (1853 -1878)  
A very significant part of Paris’s water infrastructure has been realized between 1853 and 
1925. The main investments concerned: 
a) the strategic water supply elements (mainly aqueducts and reservoirs as summarized in 
Table 11) aimed at bringing clean water to the city and storing it,  
b) water pumping stations withdrawing surface water from rivers (partially summarized 
in Table 12 and Table 13 : investments in surface water adduction (1876-1889)Table 13),   
c) Waste water treatment plant through land farming (épandage) (Table 16 and Table 15)  
d) and last but not least water distribution and networks (Table 5 and Table 14).  
In this paragraph and in the following one we will give a historical overview on these 
investments. The 1853-1925 can be framed in two time periods : a first phase goes from 1853 
to 1880 until Belgrand’s death during Paris urban transformation years ; after Belgrand a 
second phase opens and ends symbolically in 1925 with the realization of the Voulzie which is 
the last long-distance aqueduct built in Paris. 
The Haussmann and Belgrand’s era  
Haussmann was very concerned with the water supply issue30 and presented with his water 
specialist , the engineer Eugène Belgrand, three Mémoires to the city council on that topic in 
1854, in 1858 and in 1860 (Haussmann et al. 2000). Planned investments in water were 
already huge, they became even larger after the annexation of the new districts to extend 
                                                 
 
30 Referring to Haussmann’s view on Paris water André Morizet reports “Abreuver Paris ! Cette preoccupation 
qui l’etreindra sans cesse l’apparente à Napoleon”(Morizet 1932, 184, 282)  
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water and sewerage to the new areas (Figure 1).  Indeed the  population of Paris  increased  
from 1 174 346 inhabitants in 1856 to 1 696 141 in 1861, after the annexation (Bocquet, 
Chatzis, and Sander 2008) and the surface of Paris more than doubled from 34.02 to 78.02 
km2 (Morizet 1932, 278). Global investments amounts in water and sanitation during 
Haussmann’s mandate (1853-1869) add up to 150 M francs31 as summarized in the table 
below.  
Major water infrastructure were completed under Haussmann’s and Belgrand lead : the water 
supply and sewer systems’ length was extended massively as the new streets and Boulevards 
were completed (eg. 1374 km of water supply network in 1876 compared to the 364 km in 
1854). In those years the choice to install two water supply networks32 within the sewers33 
was made. One network was initially dedicated to the “public service” that is the public 
fountains and street washing (Ourcq water) and one other to the “private service”, that is 
domestic connections (Seine water and later water from the gravity aqueducts)34. 
Table 10 : Investments amounts (French francs, nominal value) in the sewerage and water systems (1851-
1873)  
Years Water system (including both network 
and strategic supply elements) 
Sewer network only 
New investments New investments Maintenance 
1851-1855 3 539 063 2 549 024 481 455 
1855-1860 7 770 653 8 085 496 1 223 332 
1861-1865 35 482 878 16 999 389 4 520 586 
1866-1870 43 317 742 17 478 301 7 069 793 
1871-1873 14 985 873 407 289 5 151 339 
Sub-total 105  096 209 45 519 499 18 446 505 
Total 150  615  708  
Source: author’s elaboration, data from Cebron de Lisle (1991, 429) 
                                                 
 
31 This amount is consistent with the figures given in Table 7 even if the time framing is not exactly the same. 
32 Both water networks are still operated in Paris today, one for drinking water (from gravity aqueducts and 
Seine water after treatment) and one for non drinking water (Ourcq and Seine water lightly treated). Domestic 
users are connected only to the the drinking water network. The Paris city council has made the decision in 
March 2012 to keep in operation the non drinking water network and invest in its maintenance.  
33 The order of magnitude in Table 5 appears to be correct since sewer system length is roughly half of the water 
network one. 
34 The size of the sewers was over-engineered in order to install within them the two water networks (and even 
other kind of networks in more recent years) according to the concept of the one single galerie technique. 
Probably the initial cost per km of sewer was higher than in a classical sewer but ex-post such a choice appear 
from the cost point of view to be smart as it is much easier and cheaper to maintain water networks installed in 
accessible sewer than underground ones. On the other hand the working conditions inside the sewers are poor 
and might have a negative impact on the workers health. According to this view the city of Paris is nowadays 
“prisoner” of a technical choice made more than a century ago when acceptable health and working conditions 
standard where much poorer than nowadays.  If the data were available it would be interesting to undertake a 
cost-benefit analysis of the (positive and negative) externalities on the long run of such a technical choice.     
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Two main sewers (collecteur general d’Asnières and collecteur de la Bièvre) were also 
completed between 1857 and 1868 for a total cost of 3.75 MF and 6.5 MF respectively. Major 
investments in water production capacity were brought to completion too, such as the Dhuis 
and Vanne long distance aqueduct (refer to the table Table 11). The latter was only initiated 
under Haussmann’s mandate and was completed only in 1976.  
Even if Haussmann and Belgrand were in favor of spring water and long-distance aqueducts 
(water quantity paradigm) rather than surface water, they invested in various surface water 
pumping plants (Austerlitz, Saint-Maur, Trilbardou and Isles – refer to Table 12) in order to 
satisfy the huge and urgent Paris’s water needs. Surface water was seen as the only solution 
able to fill the water gap in the short run but it was seen as a temporary solution since it was 
planned in the mid and long run to deliver only spring water to all districts. 
Table 11 : Main investments in water supply devices (1862-1900),  
Operation name Included 
infrastructures 
Costs (Francs) Loan Comments 
Dhuis adduction 
1862-1865 
 27 560 000   
Dhuis aqueduct 18 000 000 131 km 
Storage unit Menilmontant et 
Belleville 
4 560 000 123000 m3 
Main water distribution network 5 000 000  
Vanne adduction 
1867-1876 
 48 782 000 Partially on 
the 1865 loan 
+ 18 M on the 
1872 special 
loan 
 
Vanne aqueduct 37 230 000 173 km 
Storage unit Montrouge 6 000 000 204000  m3 
Main water distribution network 2 200 000  
Additional expenses 3 352 00035                         
Vigne and Avre 
adductions 
1891-1893 
Vigne and Avre aqueducts 35 000 000 35 M 1886 
loan36 
102 km 
Storage unit Saint Cloud 286 000 m3 
Loing and Lunain 
adductions 
1897-1900 +  
1911 – 1922 
 28 000 000 (Cebron de 
L’isle) 
70 000 00037 
23 M on the 
1894 loan 
73 km  
Pumping station 
at Sorques 
Voulzie 
1922 -1925 
 53 000 000 53 MF on 
1921 loan 
45 km 
Source : author’s elaboration, data coming from (Cebron de Lisle 1991; Beaumont-Maillet 1991) 
Clearly Haussmann and Belgrand upgraded significantly Paris’s water and sanitation services 
through an ambitious investment plan which proved to be long lasting as a great lot of 
infrastructures built in that phase are still in operation nowadays. Although a huge progress 
had been made at the end of the 1870’s compared to the initial 1852 situation, Paris’s water 
                                                 
 
35 Lemarchand (1923, 205) 
36 Lemarchand (1923, 161) 
37 Lemarchand (1923, 179), including the second phase of works 1911 - 1922 
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and sanitation infrastructure was still incomplete and investments needs were huge as we will 
detail in the next paragraph. 
5.5 Investments in water and sanitation (1878 -1925)  
After Haussmann’s fall, Belgrand kept his key role at the Direction des Eaux for a few years. 
What was the global picture of the Paris’s water and sanitation service at his death in 1878? 
On the water supply side, in the previous years the city had mainly invested in spring water 
aqueducts (Dhuis and Vanne) and water distribution systems as we detailed in the previous 
paragraph (Table 5 and Table 11). Notwithstanding, in the 1870’s the city was also pumping 
water from the Seine and the Marne rivers through various pumping stations (Table 12). Some 
of them had been obtained through the 1860 agreement and where previously operated by 
CGE while others had been built during Haussmann’s mandate.  
 In 1878 theoretical daily production capacity was somewhere between 300 000 and 370 000 
m3 depending on various factors while the planned needs were estimated in 480 000 m3 
(Cebron de Lisle 1991, 468). The daily additional water need was around 180 000 m3. 
Furthermore there were still harsh inequalities in water quality and quantity delivered between 
the wealthy city centre and the working-class inhabited outlying districts38. It was urgent to 
increase daily water production and to complete the two water distribution systems (domestic 
water and public water network).  
Table 12 : Pumping stations in operation in 1878 within Paris water service 
River Location Technical aspects comments 
Seine 
Port-à-l'anglais (Ivry) 
12 steam engines adding up to a 
total of 2130 horsepower  
ex CGE 
Maison Alfort ex CGE 
Austerlitz  
Chaillot  
Auteuil ex CGE 
Saint-Ouen ex CGE 
Marne Saint-Maur 
8 hydraulic engines + 2 steam 
engines   
Marne - Ourcq 
Isle-lès-Meuldeuse 
4 engines 
 
Tribardou  
Vanne  4 small engines  
Within the 
distribution 
network 
Montmartre 
  
Menilmontant 
Ourcq 
Source : author’s elaboration, data coming from (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 490) 
                                                 
 
38 In those years the a mortality rate  in the X,XI,XII,XIX and XX arrondissements was twice or three times the 
average one in Paris (Jaquemet 1979, 522) 
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Even nowadays sanitation is often seen as the poor relation of water supply which often 
focuses all efforts. In Paris too, until 1840, the priority had been given to investments in water 
supply rather than sanitation. Views changed when the urban renovation of Paris started and 
investing in sewers which would incorporate water supply systems was considered an 
essential part of all urban renovation operations. Although the impressive amount of 619 km 
of sewers had been completed by 1879, large investments were still needed to improve further 
the meshing of the sewer system.  
Furthermore, three major sewers39 (collecteur géneral d’Asnières, collecteur de Bièvre, 
collecteur du Nord) had been realized on the left and right bank of the river collecting waste 
water in the various areas and discharging it further downstream.  Those sewers however were 
not a solution to the huge problem of the pollution of the Seine River downstream of Paris. A 
first small-scale experiment of waste water treatment by land farming was launched by the 
city after 1865 in the outskirts of Paris (Clichy and Genevilliers). By 1878 it had showed some 
first results but needed to be extended on a larger scale. 
Table 13 : investments in surface water adduction (1876-1889) 
River Location Technical aspects Amount  comments 
Seine Ivry 85 000 m3/day 
17 M Francs 
Including two additional reservoirs of 
5 000 m3 (Gentilly) and 25 000 m3 
(Villejuif 
 Javel 25 000 m3/day  
 Bercy 50 000 m3/day  
Marne Saint-Maur 20 000 m3/day Additional steam engine 
Various Some minor investments  
Source : author’s elaboration, data coming from Cebron de Lisle (1991) 
A new investment plan (1880-1925) 
To face such a poor situation both in water supply and sanitation, huge investments were 
made between 1880 and the 1920’s, shaping Paris modern water infrastructure as many of 
them are still in use nowadays. Symbolically this investment phase ends in 1925 with the 
completion of the Voulzie adduction operation which was the last long-distance spring water   
aqueduct built in Paris. The major investments brought to completion in this phase included: 
A) Water supply  
a) new spring water aqueducts which are detailed in Table 11 : Vigne and Avre ; Loing 
and Lunain ; and finally the Voulzie in 1924, 
                                                 
 
39 The total of the three sewers give 30 km of total length and 4155 hectare of sewer collection basin area 
(Cebron de Lisle 1991, 424).   
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b) new investments in surface water production units totalizing 17 M francs between 
1876 and 1889 (Table 13),  
c) the extension of the water distribution networks from 1527 to 2867 km for a total 
invested amount of more than 20 M Francs (Table 14), 
d) the progressive use of disinfection and water treatment to purify drinking water (after 
1911), 
B) Sanitation (refer also to Box 3) 
e) the extension of the sewer system from 619 to 1303 km (in 1913) for a total invested 
amount of more than 70 M Francs (Table 14), 
f) new land farming waste water land farming units downstream of Paris able to “treat” a 
fraction of Paris daily water consumption (Table 15 and Table 16) for a total invested 
amount of more than 50 M Francs. 
How such an ambitious investment plan was financed? This is the central question we will 
analyze in the next paragraph. 
Table 14 : Investments amounts (French francs, nominal value) in the sewer and water supply networks 
(1878-1922), author’s elaboration 
Years Water supply network 
investments 
Sewer network  
investments40  
Comments 
1878-1884 
12 00 000 
10 048 930  
1885-1889 2 700 000  
1890 - 1894 1 665 367 7 782 400  
1895 -1899 2 985 000 19 053 630 Law on the tout-à-l’égout in 1894 
1900-1904 1 720 000 16 615 000 
In those years  investments were also due to 
the subway realization  
1905-1909 1 096 617 6 506 534 
1910-1914 638 315 19 035 000 
1915-1919 1 397 197 undetermined  
1920-1922 762 546 undetermined  
Sub-total 22 265 042 71 692 564  
Total 93 957 606  
Source: author’s elaboration, data from Lemarchand (third colum inspired from Lemarchand 1923, 288 , second 
column summarizing various pages from Lemarchand 1914, 134 ) 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
40 All amounts in this table give only round figures as an order of magnitude of the undertaken investments. 
Particularly on the sewer investments the original source does not appear fully consistent in all the figures which 
may still contain errors. 
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Table 15 : Main investment funds approved by the city’s council for the waste water treatment through 
land farming until 1900, funds approved by the city’s council 
Approval date Amount Comments 
Prior to 1875 4 335 000 Genneviliers pilot phase 
1892 10 500 000 Clichy pumping unit, land purchase in Garenne and Fromainville, depressed sewer 
1893 1 047 000 Land purchase 
1894 11 300 000 Herblay extension of the Achères unit,  Méry sur Oise branch, engines for the Clichy plant, Argenteuil pipe 
1897 4 520 000 Pipe and distribution network in Pierrelaye and  Carrières sous Poissy 
1900a 19 600 000 Extension of the Colombes pumping station, extension of the main Asnières sewer, additional branches towards Verneuil 
1900b 5 300 000 Pierrelaye unit and drains 
total 52 267 000  
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Lemarchand (1914) 
Table 16 : Volumes of waste water treated through land farming downstream of Paris (1872 – 1900) 
 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 
Daily water consumption Paris 
(m3) 300 000 318 782 538 000 662 840 856 635 
Daily waste water “treated“ (m3) 4 838 52 058 91 017 620 668 556 846 
Annual waste water « treated » 
(m3) 1 765 870 19 001 170 33 221 205 226 543 820 203 248 790 
Land farming surface (km2) 0.57 5.39 7.76 53.0 51.12 
Pumping engine power (horse 
power) 150 700 1 100 7 555 8 790 
Land farming unit in operation Gennevilliers Gennevilliers, Achères, Méry-Pierrelaye, Carrière-Triel 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from Lemarchand (1914) 
5.6 Financing tools for water and sanitation infrastructure (1853 – 1925) 
In the previous paragraph we sketched the major investment steps in water and sanitation. 
This section will show how the large expenses in Paris’s water and sanitation infrastructure 
have been financed in those 70 years of progressive upgrading. We will follow a 
chronological order focusing our attention on the Haussmann’s years first and on the next 
fifty years afterwards. 
The Haussmann’s era (1853-1869) 
The major urban transformation which took place under Haussmann’s mandate was 
implemented using various and innovative financing tools (described in paragraph 5.3). 
Water and sanitation investments undertaken in those years can be classified in two main 
different kinds of infrastructure: a) on one hand the strategic water supply elements (mainly 
aqueducts and reservoirs as summarised in Table 11) aimed at bringing clean water to the city 
and storing it, b) on the other hand the distribution and sewer systems. Two different 
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financing tools were adopted by Haussmann’s city administration for these two categories of 
infrastructures.  
On one hand the strategic water supply elements were financed through various municipal 
multipurpose loans (grey items in Table 6) which would finance various sectors (public 
works, water, sanitation, schools).  
On the contrary water distribution and sewer systems have been financed through bond 
emission only to a small extent. They were partly financed through ordinary public funds 
coming from the city’s budget (surplus)41. Annual expenses increased massively after 1857 
when annual allocation on the ordinary budget dedicated to water investments were increased 
from 0.5 to 1 M francs42 (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 429).  But there is still some money missing 
to cover the large costs of these networks.  
It appears that networks (water and sanitation) were largely built in the context of integrated 
urban renovation operations which transformed Paris in Haussmann’s years and afterwards. 
Network development was only a single element of more complex and large operations 
through which entire buildings, streets and areas were renovated. Network costs were then 
absorbed in the global cost of these operations which were financed through complex and 
controversial schemes such as the Caisse de travaux and the Bons de delegation which we 
described in the paragraph 5.343.  
In both cases44 of “Integrated Urban Development Mechanisms”, the capital gain expected on 
the property value (land value capture) was the key concept behind. The network 
development phase was then partly financed by these schemes based on land value capture. 
                                                 
 
41 Obviously it is much easier to finance on ordinary budget surplus the network extension rather than a new 
aqueduct since the network extension rhythm can be adapted easily to the existing budget while half an aqueduct 
is not that useful. 
42 After 1870 the sewer system extension slowed down suddenly because money was given in priority to the 
Vanne aqueduct operation (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 429). Both Table 10 and Table 5 confirm this fact. The latter 
also shows an increase in sewerage extension after 1894 due to the new law on the “tout à l’égout” through 
which no other disposal  method  for waste water was legal except the discharge in the sewer system (Cebron de 
Lisle 1991, 595). 
43 “New investments” in water and sewerage “ were paid through the Caisse des travaux”, in particular in the 
new areas of Paris after the annexation (Belgrand 1873, 327–329, tome 4, quoted by ; Cebron de Lisle 1991, 
429).  
44 The main idea was that the city would give a concession to a contractor for expropriating and acquiring some 
areas, demolishing the old buildings and streets, realizing the new Boulevard, including the water and sewer 
system, giving it back to the city and finally selling either the land or the new buildings (Gallais-Hamonno 2007; 
Massa-Gille 1973). 
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On the contrary the large lump-sum investments needed to build the “strategic water supply 
devices” were mainly financed through municipal bonds.  
Investment financing policy under the Troisième république  
We have already described in paragraph 5.3 how prefect Haussmann lost progressively his 
power in 1969 due to the complex investment mechanism implemented. Those mechanisms 
considered by his opponents as a hidden and illegal debt which would seriously limit the 
city’s capability to invest in the forthcoming decades. 
Thus, after Haussmann’s years the city’s council was very reluctant to borrow in spite of the 
huge city’s investments needs in various sectors including water and sanitation. Nevertheless, 
the city had no other choice than issuing three more loans in 186945 (consolidation loan with 
the Crédit Foncier), in 1871 (war debt to the Prussian government) and in 1872 (Vanne 
adduction). The 1872 loan was urgently needed to complete the Vanne adduction operation 
which had been stopped due to the 1870 war. A 19.5 MF loan was subscribed with the Crédit 
Industriel et Commercial and specifically dedicated to the Vanne operation even if the 
financial conditions were not favourable46.  
The 1875 and 1876 loans had to be issued too in order to consolidate the debt and to partially 
finance urban renovation operations which were part of the Troisième réseau previously 
planned. Those operations were still under completion, at least until 1890, under the 
responsibility of the same Mr Alphand who had been the director of the Municipal Public 
Works department under Haussmann. The controversial mechanisms of the Caisse des 
Travaux and the Bons de delegation were not anymore in use after Hausmann’s fall. 
Nevertheless, Integrated Urban Development mechanisms based on “hidden borrowing” and 
land value capture still continued to be used by Alphand’s department to finance urban 
renovation operations including water and sewer systems (Morizet 1932, 337).  
After the 1871, 1872, 1875 and 1876 loans, seen as legacy of the past, no other loans were 
issued by the city until 1886. Indeed, the majority of the City’s council was opposed to any 
deficit finance investment plan and was convinced instead that investments should be 
financed on ordinary budget’s surplus as much as possible. This was a huge constraint on the 
                                                 
 
45 The 1869 loan was issued still under Haussmann’s mandate.  
46 In fact the city redeemed that loan a few years later  with the funds collected with the 1875 loan which had 
been issued at better financial conditions. 
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development of modern infrastructure in a city with a massive demographic growth rate of 
14% (between 1876 and 1881) in those years (Jaquemet 1979).  
Due to the City’s council ostracism to loan issuing, until 1887, the only source of funding 
available consisted in annual funds taken on the surplus of the municipal’s budget. As a 
consequence, most of the 17M investments (Table 13) in surface water plants47 brought to 
completion between 1876 to 1889 have been financed on ordinary funds (Cebron de Lisle 
1991, 493).  
Progressively, as the time distance with Haussmann’s years increased, the city’s council 
became more favorable to the idea of issuing new loans. In fact, in many sectors the needs 
were so urgent that investments could hardly be postponed. The borrowing constraint was 
particularly heavy to bear for the water and sanitation sector in terms of poor sanitary 
conditions48 in a city that had reached 2 269 023 inhabitants in 1881 (Jaquemet 1979). Indeed, 
WSS infrastructures available were largely insufficient to prevent epidemics of cholera (major 
epidemics events in 1884 and 1892) and typhoid fever which were particularly recurrent in 
such a context of large demographic growth. In addition, those were the years of great 
knowledge progress in microbiology, hygiene and medicine which investigated and 
progressively demonstrated the key link between microbes and diseases and the causality 
between the access to clean water and sanitation and epidemics control49.  
Increasing concern for sanitary conditions (particularly in the outlying districts) and the great 
cholera epidemic of 1881 played a role in making the member of the city’s council to allocate 
60 M Francs over the total 250 M Francs of the 1886 loan50 to water and sanitation 
infrastructure (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 482). The amount of 60 M was far below what the water 
and sanitation department had asked but still allowed to finance various operations mainly 
concerning water supply. Once again sanitation had been considered the poor relation of water 
supply. 
Some funds (27 MF) were allocated to water and sanitation, including the Achères land-
farming project, on the 1892-94 loan (200MF). However it was only in 1894 that sanitation 
                                                 
 
47 Particularly Ivry water plant and the extension of Saint-Maur water plant. 
48 Refer to the “snapshot” of the 1878 situation given in the previous paragraph. 
49 For example, the causality between drinking water and cholera had been described by Dr Marey at the 
Académie de Médecine in 1884 (Jaquemet 1979, 525). 
50 The main scopes of the 1886 loan were investments in schools (Jules Ferry law on schools in 1881-82) and 
public works. WSS Allocations :Vigne and Avre water  adduction : 35 MF ; water plants and networks : 15 MF ; 
Sanitation : 8 MF ; Canals : 2 MF 
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rose to the top of the polical agenda both at City’s council and parliament level. The Tout-à-
l’égout was made compulsory, the city was authorised to levy an administrative tax on 
wastewater collected (refer also to paragraph 6.1) and the Achères land farming project was 
approved. A 117.5 MF loan was issued in 189651 to finance the  Loing and Lunain adduction 
(50 MF),  sewers (35.2 MF) and wastewater treatment in Achères (30.8 MF). The priority was 
not only to invest in sanitation but also to increase water supply (possibly from spring 
sources) as water consumption was expected to increase due to the generalization of the tout-
à-l’égout.  The availability of borrowed funds after 1886, 1892-94 and 1896 explains the 
increasing amount of investments made in the years afterwards, especially in sanitation, 
extending the sewer system and increasing the irrigated areas in the land farming process.  
Box 3 : The tout-à-l’égout and land-farming debate 
Although the rhythm of investments in sanitation was not as high as needed, the debate in the 1880’s was very 
rich both on the tout-à-l’égout issue and on the use of land-farming to treat wastewater downstream of Paris 
(Jaquemet 1979). Opposition52 to the tout-à-l’égout system53 was coming mainly from landlords and cesspool 
emptiers.  The first were opposed because the tout-à-l’égout implied a domestic water connection with higher 
consumption of water and higher costs. Cesspool emptiers too were obviously against the tout-à-l’égout which 
would seriously threat their business model. A second debate was taking place on whether it was appropriate to 
use landfarming (champs d’épandage) to treat waste water downstream of Paris (Genevilliers, Achères, Saint-
Germain)  in order to lighten the pollution’s burden on the Seine river and to use waste water as an productive 
input for agriculture.  The planned project implied to use lands which were property of the State, an approval by 
the Government was required for the city to obtain the right to use those areas. Meanwhile a fierce opposition 
was coming from the inhabitants and local authorities of the concerned areas. But opposition to such a project 
was also coming from some politicians and members of the scientific circle in favour of an alternative project 
consisting in a canal from Paris to the sea (Jaquemet 1979). 
The waste water was delivered both in areas partially purchased by the city of Paris and delegated to farmers and 
in fields fully owned by private farmers  (17.97 km2 of Domaines versus 33.33 km2 of Cultures libres 
respectively in 190954). Although waste water treatment through land-farming irrigation  mitigated the Seine’s 
pollution at first, in fact the allowed absorption volumes55 were chronically insufficient as the collected waste 
                                                 
 
51 It was issued in 1896 jointly with an additional consolidation loan with the Credit Foncier. 
 
52 Even the French scientific circle was opposed to that solution at first (Jaquemet 1979). 
53 The tout-à-l’égout means feces collection through the main sewer while in Paris feces were still mainly 
collected through cesspools (fosses d’aisance) and sanitary tubes (tinettes filtrantes). 
54 Figures from Bellanger (2010, 112)  
55 The April 4th 1889 law authorized to discharge a maximum volume of 40 000 m3 per hectare of irrigated 
surface and per year (Bellanger, Pineau, and SIAAP 2010, 111). 
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water volumes were growing faster than the irrigated surfaces. Absorption capacities started to deacrease after 
1902 (law on maximal absorption capacity) and even more after 1906 as the agriculture practices decreased in 
Genevilliers due to the industrialization and urbanization process (Bellanger, Pineau, and SIAAP 2010, 110–
112). In addition to that, using waste water for irrigation in agriculture was not such a smooth process as thought 
initially. Farmers planned their water demand according to the crop seasonal demand (higher demand in dry 
season, lower demand in humid season) in order to maximise their crop production while the water offer from 
the city was related to sewer water collected volumes (higher offer in rain season, lower in dry season). 
Increasing conflicts arose since the city’s engineers considered agriculture in terms of water absorption capacity 
while in the farmers’s view it was a crop production value’s maximisation issue (Bellanger, Pineau, and SIAAP 
2010, 110). The decline of waste water treatment through land farming has started; however the shift to 
biological lagooning technology (épandage biologique) would not be implemented until the 1920’s investment 
plan and the realization of the Achères I waste water treatment plant in 1942. 
After the water and sanitation loans phase (1886 to 1896), between 1898 and 1905 large loans 
were issued by the city to finance the gas network and the Metropolitain (subway). Those 
loans did not directly finance water and sanitation investments. However executing the works 
for the subway implied large expenses to move the water distribution and sewer networks 
which were financed with special funds coming from the subway loans56. This partially 
explains the investments amounts in networks (Table 14) even if the sewer and water supply 
networks were roughly completed by 1900-1905 having already a quite stable length of 2632 
km (water) and 1173 km (sewer) (Table 5).  
Two additional loans financing water and sanitation were issued in 1908 and 1910. The 1908 
31 MF loan, subscribed with the Credit Foncier, was issued specifically to finance urgent 
works on water and sanitation (see table below).  
Table 17 : 1908 loan’s funds allocation 
1908 loan’s  funds allocation Amounts (MF) 
Upgrading of the drinking water service through new drinking water treatment units 5.3 
Upgrading of the “public” (raw) water system – Extension of the Austerlitz pumping plant and size-doubling 
of the Villejuif reservoir 5.4 
Water distribution networks and works due to the subway construction 6.8 
Waste water treatment - (new engines in Colombes and Clichy + extension in Achères) 7 
Other expenses, including Avre adduction compensatory damages 5.5 
Financial costs, studies and other expenses 1 
  
Total 31 
Source : author’s elaboration, data from the June 29th 1907 Law (République Française 1912) 
                                                 
 
56 Evidence of this fact is given by the Compte administrative  of 1910 page 846 – 860. It is also confirmed by 
(Lemarchand 1914; 1923) . 
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The 1910 loan (the so called Emprunt des grands travaux) was planned to be issued in various 
phases of 235 MF each, totalizing 900 MF. However only the first issuing operation took 
place and only 17 MF were allocated to the water and sanitation department in front of 130 
MF planned investments which were supposed to be financed step by step on the various 
issuing phases of the loan57. 
After World War I, a large loan of 1800 MF was issued in 1921. Funds from the loan were 
partially allocated to water and sanitation investments on which funds from the 1910 loan had 
been initially allocated but not obtained in the end (107.7 MF). Allocations58 included the 
Voulzie adduction operation (roughly 53 M Francs) which is the last long distance spring 
water adduction operation realized in Paris and symbolically closes the major investment 
phase in water and sanitation services. The scientific knowledge progress in microbiology and 
sanitary engineering had already started around 1910 to experiment water treatment and 
disinfection techniques including ozone disinfection59. The Paris water services were 
progressively closing the water quantity and water systems paradigm” while discovering the 
“water treatment and water quality paradigm” (Barraqué 2003b).  
5.7 The key role of long term debt 
Most of Paris’s water infrastructures were shaped in the 1853-1925 years. In a first phase, 
within Paris’s urban transformation, three financing tools were used : funds taken on the city’s 
ordinary budget surplus, integrated urban development mechanisms and municipal loans. 
Lump-sum and costly investments such as long-distance aqueducts were financed through 
long-term municipal loans. On the contrary time-spread investments such as water and 
sanitation networks were largely realized in the framework of Paris’s urban transformation 
and financed through integrated urban development mechanisms. After the completion of 
                                                 
 
57 The planned 125 MF investment included : 21.8 MF on surface water pumping stations in order to increase 
pressure in the nework, 50 MF on the Voulzie spring water adduction, 5.5 MF on sewers ; 13 MF on main sewers 
and 18 MF on waste water treatment. On the 17 MF allocated, 5.5 MF were used on surface water pumping 
(pressure increase), 7.1 MF on sewers.   Source : Note à l’appui des comptes de dépense de 1912, Paris, 
Direction administrative des travaux de Paris 
58 Allocations : Urgent extraordinary maintenance needs for water, sanitation and canals (14.7 MF) ; 33 MF of 
already undertaken works (including 20 MF on sanitation) ; 60 MF for water investments (including 53 MF) for 
the Voulzie adduction operation.  (Denais 1921) 
59 A competition had been held for the best disinfection technique to be tested in a pilot project within the Saint 
Maur water treatment plant. The 1908 loan allocated funds to water treatment and disinfections. Filtration basins 
were already in operations by 1910 on the Ivry water plant. References : Note à l’appui des comptes de dépense 
de 1912, Paris, Direction administrative des travaux de Paris. In 1911 water disinfection starts to be implemented 
on an industrial basis and after 1914 all surface water delivered to domestic users (in addition to spring water) 
has been previously filtered (Lemarchand 1923, 876).  
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Paris urban transformation in 1890, integrated urban development mechanisms played a 
minor role in water and sanitation investments and the great majority of water and sanitation 
infrastructure were financed on municipal loans.  
Municipal debt appears to be the key economic instrument implemented to channel savings 
into public infrastructure generating growth. Indeed, in the second half of the 19th century 
savings were high in France and still largely unproductive60. Both Paris’s municipal bonds 
and the Crédit Foncier bonds allowing to finance the “Bons de délégation” (Figure 3) were 
attractive investments. 
Most of the time the city publicly issued its own municipal bonds but there have also been 
some cases of loans with bank intermediation, mostly with the Crédit Foncier. Indeed, in the 
case of bank intermediation, the city was allowed by the parliament to subscribe loans only 
with the Crédit Foncier, the Caisse des depots and the Caisse Nationale des Retraites pour la 
Vieillesse61.   
In fact, the Parliament’s control on city’s debt was very tight in those years as not only a law 
was required to approve the loan but also the funds’ allocation was submitted to the central 
state approval62 and a “déclaration d’utilité publique” (eminent domain declaration) was 
required for most works. 
The municipal loans were mainly multipurpose ones allocated to various sectors of the city’s 
administration. Allocations decisions were made by the city’s council and approved by the 
Government. Most of the time, water and sanitation financing needs were curbed down in 
order to give more funds to other sectors63 which were considered to have priority. Only a few 
loans were specifically issued to finance water infrastructure (in 1872 and 1908) and justified 
on the high degree of “urgency” of the investments. 
The City’s fiscal revenues were given as loan collateral in most of the loans we detailed. 
Indeed loan’s approval by the Parliament was based on the principle of using additional tax 
                                                 
 
60 Marchand (2011) and Gandy (1999) 
61 Example : Loi 2 mai 1921 autorisant le département de la Seine à souscrire un emprunt de 500 millions  euros 
sur 50 ans ; Loi 10 juin 1921 autorisant emprunt 1800 millions pour la Ville de Paris 
62 « Les travaux prévus ne pourront être entrepris qu’autant que les modalités d’execution techniques auront 
étés approuvées par le Ministre de l’Intérieur  après avis du conseil supérieur de l’hygiène publique de 
France. » (République Française 1912, 278) 
63 For example it was the case for the 1892-94 loan or for the 1910 loan. 
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revenue64 as a collateral. Since the water and sanitation financing needs were often left 
unsatisfied in the city’s council funds allocation decisions, various attempts were made in the 
1880’s  to convince the city’s council to approve a specific loan dedicated to water investment 
and having as a collateral the estimated future revenues of the water and sanitation service. 
All those attempts did not succeed in obtaining the City’s council approval (Cebron de Lisle 
1991, 480). It was only with the 1894 tout-à-l’égout law that a 117.5 MF loan having the new 
sanitation levy as a collateral was approved by the City’s Council and by the Parliament. 
Somehow the sanitation levy, based on the property value, was still considered more similar 
to a fiscal revenue than to a tariff. It was only in 1980 that water revenues were partially used 
as collateral to issue a loan65 and indeed the debt’s service to payback that loan was accounted 
for within the water department accounting chapters while it was not the case for all the other 
loans as we will show further in paragraph 6.2. 
Most of the issued loans had a very long maturity66. According to Marchand (2011) savers in 
those years were trusting long term investments of that kind thanks to the gold standard  
comforting effect. In retrospect view however, those savers lost most of their money as the 
great inflation of the 1910-1930 years curbed down severely in real terms the profitability of 
their investments. Indeed, we will further analyse the key effect of inflation in paragraph 6.3 
while next section will sketch what were the cost-sharing effects of these mechanisms in the 
long run. Who was the end-payer in fine in those schemes? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
64 The June 10th 1921 law authorised for example the city to raise 50 additional centimes on the tax base : “50 
centimes aditionnels) aditionnels au principal des 4 contributions directes” 
65 A special fund was created to collect up to 3MF coming from water revenues and allowing to cover the loan’s 
amortization. That special fund was supposed to be the collateral for the three first years while the general 
budget would be used as a collateral afterwards. (République Française 1912, 278) 
66 Another peculiarity of most loans was that they allowed a time spread credit tranche drawing which could best 
follow the works’ rhythm. This is daily practice nowadays but it was an innovative practice in those years. 
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Table 18 : Loans issued by the city of Paris 1869 – 1930,  in grey  loans on which water infrastructures 
were partly financed. 
 
Year 
of issue 
Capital Interest rate Annual 
lots 
KF 
 
Duratio
n 
 
Payment 
duration 
 
Main scopes (WSS details) 
 
collected 
MF 
nominal 
MF 
coupon 
% 
effective 
% 
1871 350 517.32 3.0 5.36 1 500 75 4 terms over 1 
year 
War contribution and 
consolidation loan 
1872 19.5 19.5 6.0 5.99 no 5 to 20 4 terms over 3 
months 
Vanne water adduction operation  
18 MF 
1875 220 250 4.0 5.0 900 75 3 terms over 2 
years 
Consolidation and public works 
1876 129 120 4.0 4.84 500 73 3 terms over 21 
months 
Public works and buildings incl. 
Rue Reaumur 
1886 249.75 
 
WSS : 60 
277.5 3.0 3.88 1 000 75 1 term Public works (incl WSS) 
 
Vigne and Avre : 35 MF  
Water (plants and networks) : 15 
MF 
Sanitation : 8 MF 
Canals : 2 MF 
1892-
94 
200 
WSS : 27 
231 2.5 3.63 800 79 7 terms over 5 
years 
Public works, WSS and schools 
 
WSS : 27 including Achères 
waste water land-farming 
1894-
96 
- 
WSS: 
117.5 
161.5 2.5 3.45 646 77 1 term Public works schools and WSS67 
+ payback and consolidation 
with Crédit Foncier 
 
1898 300.1 344.8 2.0 3.02 1 200 74  Conversion 
1886 loan + subway 
1899 
 
169 206 2.0 3.12 600 78 6 terms over 3 
years 
subway 
1904 
 
170 193 2.5 4.08 700 75 9 terms over 3.5 
years 
Subway Pas en morizet 
1905 100 105 2.75 3.66 400 35 4 terms over 1 an Gas 
1906 105  3.55   50 Loan with the 
Crédit Foncier 
Gas, pompes funèbres and 
schools 
1908 4.58  3.60   18 Loan with the 
Crédit Foncier 
 
1908 31  31 3.75   3.783  53 Loan with the 
Crédit Foncier 
Water and sanitation only 
Refer to Table 17   
1910a 45 46 2.75 3.51 210.8 69 1 term subway 
1910b 23568 241 3.0 3.59 1 810 80 8 terms over 3 
years 
Public works  
17MF on water and sanitation 
1912a  100 3.75   66 Loan with the 
Crédit Foncier 
Subway 
1912b  205 3 3.73   39   Gas 
1913  20 4.2   78 Loan with the 
CNRV69  
Social Housing (Habitations 
bons marché) 
1919  1500 5   61  War debt consolidation 
1920  400 6.7570   50   
1921  1800 5.75   61  Muncipal budget deficit (1820-
1821),  social housing, public 
works incl. WSS (107.7 MF)71 
Sources : author’s elaboration, data from Annuaire Statistique de la Ville de Paris 1925, Morizet (1932, 332) and Gallais-
Hamonno (2007, Electronic Annex II).  
                                                 
 
67 Loing and Lunain : 50MF ; Sewers : 35.2 MF; Wastewater treatment (Achères) : 30.8 MF 
68 It is the so called emprunt des grands travaux – initially 900 MF loan but only first draft issued (235 MF). 
69 Caisse Nationale des Retraites pour la  Vieilliesse   
70 6.75 interest rate until 1938, then 6.70 
71Water : 60MF (incl.53 M for the Voulzie adduction) ; Sanitation : 33MF ; urgent extraordinary 
maintenance14.7 MF (Denais 1921) 
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6 Long-run cost allocation and intergenerational effect 
Once analysed how an investment has been financed, as done in the previous sections, it is a 
key issue to discuss the long run (final) cost allocation which might be very different from the 
short run one. In other words it is essential to distinguish the (short run) financial solution 
from the (long run) economic equilibrium. This section is focused on such an issue. 
For example let us think of an aqueduct which in the short run has been financed through 
municipal bonds.  Depending on various institutional choices the loan’s burden might weigh 
down different stakeholders: the local or national tax payers if the loan repayment comes from 
fiscal resources (municipal or national), the users if the revenue from the service repays the 
loan or a mix of both categories. If we adopt the OECD 3T’s methodology72 (OECD 2009), 
which one of the 3T’s did pay back the investment in fine ? The answer is not straightforward 
since the water, sanitation and canals departments were part of the municipal administration 
and accounted within the municipal general budget. To tackle such a question paragraph 6.1 
will focus on the way water and sanitation revenues were collected, paragraph 6.2 will 
analyse WSS’s financial flows in the 1893-1920 time frame, paragraph 6.3 will deal with the 
role played by inflation while paragraph 6.4 will further discuss the long run cost allocation.     
6.1 Billing water and taxing sanitation 
Under Hausmmann’s mandate water infrastructure was seen as a potential source of revenues 
for the city. It made sense then to capitalize these revenues through a loan which they would 
payback. Haussmann and his municipal administration had already an industrial and 
commercial vision of the water service. That vision is quite similar to the “municipal 
capitalism” described by Millward (2000, 324) as the main driver in favour of public 
ownership73.  According to such a vision, the Compagnie Générale des Eaux (CGE) was 
entrusted through the 1860 agreement74 of régie intéréssée with the task of collecting the 
water bills75 (refer to section 4). Through such an agreement water service revenues were 
                                                 
 
72 3T’s : Tariff, Transfer, Taxes 
73 According to Millward (2000), municipal enterprise in England in the second half of the 19th century is much 
more driven by  the will to increase municipal revenues through municipal enterprise’s rates rather than a 
municipal socialism ideology which in fact appeared later in the early decades of the 20th century. 
74 Un amendment to the 1860 agreement was signed in 1869. A new agreement was signed on February 11th 
1911 at the expiry of the first one. A third agreement was signed on February 1930. 
75 The municipality kept under its own responsibility (régie directe) the commercial relationship with water users 
within the public administration. 
  
44
secured and the commercial risk taken by CGE. The municipality could focus its attention on 
operations and especially on investments and works. 
In 1854 only one building over five in Paris had a domestic water connection. Twenty years 
later one building over two was connected as the number of domestic water connections 
increased from 6229 to 39 104 (Chatzis 2006). At first two kinds of subscriptions were 
available: the robinet libre and the à la jauge subscription. The first implied an unlimited 
quantity of water and was offered only for Ourcq water. The latter consisted in a pipe gauged 
allowing only a fixed discharge. It implied having a water storage capacity within the 
building. It was used for the  Seine water connections (and also later for the spring water 
connections) in the purpose of better controlling consumption (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 191). It 
is only after 1880 that subscriptions with water meters76 started to be set up in order both to 
disincentive excessive water consumption and to increase water revenues through a more 
faithful metering and billing (Chatzis 2006). After 1894 only meter subscriptions are 
allowed77 for spring water which is sold at 0.35 F/m3 with a concessional tariff for low 
income buildings78.  
In the first half of the 19th century landlords were not keen on subscribing domestic water 
connections due to the implied costs both in the initial investment79 and in the operations as a 
water connection implied emptying more frequently the cesspools (fosses d’aisance) at the 
bottom of the building80. Later81, with the diffusion of the sanitary tubes (tinettes filtrantes) 
such a disincentive to water connection disappeared as water consumption had no more 
impact on the tinettes emptying frequency. Landlord’s resistance to domestic water 
connection was curbed down progressively both by the tenants demand for water connected 
flats and by the city economic incentives. At the end of the 1870’s lower water tariffs were 
approved and free installation of standpipes to bring water to all floors was proposed by the 
                                                 
 
76 Due to their significant cost, only one meter per building is set up implying that an agreement on costs’ 
allocation has to be found among the building’s inhabitants. According to Barraqué (forthcoming) users 
downstream of the meter might be considered as members of a “common pool” community allowing to share the 
bill’s burden and in the same time avoiding the transaction cost of individual meters. 
77 While the number of subscriptions to the domestic water supply increased, the number of public fountains and 
water extraction points decreased with harsh effect on access to water for low income people (Barraqué 
forthcoming).     
78 Surface water was sold cheaper, roughly around 0.20 F/m3 (Lemarchand 1923, 874) 
79 Connecting to the water network had significant initial costs of nearly three times the annual subscription fee 
(Cebron de Lisle 1991, 190).   
80Indeed the costs of emptying the cesspools were the landlord’s responsibility. 
81 The Tinettes filtrantes  were authorized and became more frequently used after 1851 (Jaquemet 1979). 
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city to all un-connected building owners engaging themselves in a minimal annual water 
subscription (Bocquet, Chatzis, and Sander 2008, 8).  
As soon as the landlords’ opposition to water connection had been curbed down a new 
controversy arose with the tout-à-l’égout issue (refer also to Box 3 in next paragraph). 
Landlords were harshly opposed to such a change since it would imply a sanitation levy (taxe 
sur les tuyaux de chute) based on the property value which they considered as an “unequal” 
progressive tax which would increase sanitation charges from 0.75 to 1.75 % of the gross 
property revenue (Jaquemet 1979, 536). Notwithstanding the various oppositions, the 1894 
tout-à-l’égout law was approved: a sanitation levy82 had to be payed by all owners of 
buildings with a sewer nearby83. The tax amount was based on the after tax net revenue and 
was not very progressive (from 10 to 1500 Francs)84. The tout-à-l’égout was progressively 
extended to all buildings. The connection’s rhythm was however quite slow. Indeed, by 1913 
one building out of three had not yet adopted the tout-à-l’égout sytem.85  
With the 1894 law, not only did the sanitation service start to produce some revenues but also 
the water service’s revenues were increasing since subscription to the water service was made 
compulsory too86. Incredibly the 1894 water tariff (0.35 F/m3) was kept constant until 1920 
when a new tariff of 0.65 F/m3 was approved (Lemarchand 1923, 874). Due to the huge 
inflation of those years, in 1925 and 1926 new administrative acts87 settled that water price 
should be indexed-link to coal and salaries. Indeed water tariff increased significantly from 
1.05 F/m3 in the first semester of 1925 to 1.46 F/m3 in 192888. In the next paragraph we will 
analyze more deeply the financial equilibrium of the water and sanitation service. While in 
paragraph 6.3 we will analyze the role played by inflation. 
6.2 Financial flows of the water and sanitation services 
A simplified model to analyse the data 
                                                 
 
82 The tax is called « Taxe municipale sur les tuyaux de raccordement à l’égout » in the 1894 law. 
83 Décision of the city’s council January 27th 1892 (Bellanger, Pineau, and SIAAP 2010, 85). 
84 The minimal annual tax of 10 F had to be payed for a building having a revenue lower than 500 F. A 
maximum tax amount of 1500 F had to be payed for a building having a revenue higher than 100 000 F  (Cebron 
de Lisle 1991, 648). The tax rate appear to be higher for low revenue buildings than for high revenue ones (2% 
and 1.5%) respectively. 
85 24 000 out of 71 000 total buildings in Paris. 
86 Officially water subscription was made compulsory to ensure a sufficient fluidity to the sewer system but an 
implicit objective was also to improve the financial equilibrium of the water service (Bellanger, Pineau, and 
SIAAP 2010, 84) 
87 « Arreté reglementaire » du 11 juillet 1925 et du 21 aout 1926 
88 Archives Departementales de Paris, archival reference 2709W 24, « liasse 8 » 
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In the previous paragraph we have discussed how water and sanitation revenues were 
collected. In this paragraph we will analyse the global picture of Paris WSS’s financial flows. 
The institutional scheme and the associated financial flows (1894-1925) are schematized in 
the following figure. Water, sanitation and canals were municipally managed and their budget 
was part of the city’s general budget (the grey shaded area in the figure below). We analysed 
various years of the city’s annual financial report. We adopted the classical 3 T’s OECD 
approach in our analysis and built a simple model to analyse the cost sharing between the 
Tariff revenues and the Tax revenues. The city’s annual financial report (Compte 
administratif de l’année…) included distinct chapters for water, sanitation and canals89. The 
city’s annual financial report in those years adopted a very classical accounting scheme: 
Recettes (receipts) and Dépenses (expenses) which are subdivided into ordinaires and 
extraordinaires ones. 
Revenues coming from “Tariffs” in those years were coming from the domestic water users 
through water billing, from the canal navigation users and from the landlords which were 
paying a sanitation levy. Although such a levy was very similar to a property tax, we argue 
that to our purpose it can be considered as a contribution to the “Tariff” part of the revenues. 
Doing so, we agree with Massarutto90 (2002; 2007) and inspire our analysis from the 
accounting scheme he proposes. Additional (minor) revenues were also coming from the 
phone and telegraph servitude fees91 and from the amounts paid by the outskirts districts 
which were partially discharging their waste water into the city of Paris’s sewers near 
Achères92.  
On the costs side three main categories should be distinguished: Operation and Maintenance 
(O&M), the debt service and new investments expenditures. Concerning the two first 
categories, only a fraction of those costs was accounted for in the water, sanitation and canals 
                                                 
 
89 Depending on the year, the Water, Canals and Sanitation have one distinct chapter in the Compte administratif 
de l’année or not. In the 1910 edition, Water and canals have one subsection and sanitation has a second 
subsection within the same chapter (chapter 17 in expenses and chapter 21 in receipts). In the 1920 and 1925 
1930 editions Water, Sanitation and canals have distinct budgetary chapters (water - chap 35, sanitation - chapter 
36 and canals – chapter 37) within the “industrial services” (services industriels) part of the municipal financial 
report. In the 1930 edition Water and sanitation are together in chapter 35 while Canals is separately accounted 
for in chapter 36. 
90 “It is often a pure terminologic convention that of considering revenues either as direct charges or taxation. 
What really matters is who pays, for what purpose and how much, and what is the customer actually obtaining in 
exchange of what is paid.”(Massarutto 2002, 25) 
91 1.45 MF in 1910 
92 139 183 F in 1910, Note à l’appui du compte 1910 
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(WSC) chapter of the city’s financial report, part of them was mixed up in the various global 
chapters of the city’s budget. For example most of the debt service expenditures were 
accounted for in a global expenses chapter (chapter 3). Only the royalties paid to the CGE93 
and to the former private companies concessionnaires of the canals94 and the 31 MF 1908 
water loan debt service charge are accounted for within the WSC ordinary expenses chapters.  
Figure 4 : Institutional scheme and financial flows of Paris’s WSS (1894 1925) 
 
Source : author’s elaboration 
O&M expenses too were partially accounted for in the WSC ordinary expenses chapters and 
partially mixed up in various global expenditures chapters. We will refer to these latter parts 
of the expenses as “external O&M costs”. Prior to 1920, it is almost impossible to put a figure 
on those external O&M costs. In the 1920, 1925 and 1930 years, some expenditures are still 
                                                 
 
93 CGE :50 annual installments of  1 600 000 F to be paid  until 1910 
94 Saint Maur water unit : 125 000 F until 1914, Canal Saint Martin 180 000 F  until 1922 (Morizet 1932, 329) ; 
Ourcq and Saint Denis canals 540 000 F. Details on the 1864 Saint Maur concession are given in Bezançon 
(1999, 133) 
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mixed up in the global expenses chapters but they are also estimated and mentioned in the 
WSC chapters. It appears that O&M external costs, unaccounted within the WSC chapters, 
include a significant part of the Human Resources (including all the engineers’ salaries) and 
of the energy costs.  
What about the very large investments expenses which we described in the previous section. 
These were accounted for in a separate section95 mentioning clearly on which loan funds they 
should be paid. No accounting depreciation was in use. Thus, it makes sense in our analysis to 
account for investment costs only through the debt service section of our model. To make an 
estimation of the debt service amount we have realized a simplified model based on the loans 
issued by the city. Only the capital fractions of the loan having financed water and sanitation 
investments have beeen considered (refer to Annex 2). Effective interest rates and maturities 
are taken from Table 18. Debt’s redemption is considered linear and with no grace period96. 
Such a model is too simple to fully represent the complexity of the city’s debt service as Table 
21 shows. The model underestimates debt service when compared to the figures given by the 
city’s annual financial report for the 1920,1925 and 1930 years. However we will show that 
such a model is still a useful tool to get an idea of the order of magnitude and trends of the 
variables. The city’s accounting scheme and the model we adopted in our analysis are 
summarized and compared in Table 19.  
Results on O&M costs sharing 
The principal financial results for the Water Sanitation and Canal (WSC) service are given in 
Table 20 and Table 21 while the detailed financial results are given in Annex 1. 
It appears clearly that until 1925 “Tariff” revenues were not even sufficient to cover the 
Canals and Sanitation O&M costs, even without considering “hidden subsidies” (WSC O&M 
external costs). In the 1925 and 1930 years, “Tariff” revenues fully covered Sanitation O&M 
costs even taking into account external O&M costs while they covered canals97 O&M costs 
                                                 
 
95 Dépenses extraordinaires affectées sur fonds d’emprunt 
96 This is a very basic hypothesis which does not fully represent what where the loans characteristics in terms of 
grace period. Indeed in various cases loans were emitted with a significant grace period in order to start 
amortizing freshly issued loans only when past debt’s amortization ended. For example this was the case for the 
1910 and 1921 loans with a grace period going until 1950 and 1929 respectively. Indeed in 1929 the 
amortization of the 1865 loan ended while in 1950 the amortization of the 1865, 1875 and 1876 loans ended 
(Denais 1921). 
97 In 1930 canals “tariff” revenues increased also because it started billing Ourcq water consumption to the water 
service (1.67 MF). Another internal transfer is due to the water consumption by the Sanitation service to wash 
sewers. Those internal transfers between the services have been neutralized in our model. 
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only when not considering external O&M costs. By definition, costs uncovered by “Tariff” 
revenues are covered by the City’s general budget, meaning “Tax” revenues according to the 
OECD definition. 
Table 19 : Water, sanitation and canals accounting scheme and model (1893-1930) 
Cost 
classification Accounting entries in use Content’s description Approach in our model 
O&M 
Internal O&M costs : 
Data in the Water, 
Sanitation and Canals 
ordinary expenses chapters  
-Human resources (except 
engineers) 
-materials 
-Technical maintenance 
-CGE’s fee  
Summarized from the existing 
data in the Water, Sanitation and 
Canals ordinary expenses chapters 
External O&M costs : 
Within other chapters of the 
city’s financial report, 
unknown for the 1893 - 
1910 years, mentioned 
distinctly in the 1920, 1925 
and 1930 years 
-Human resources 
expenditures (engineers and 
executives) 
-Part of the heating and 
energy expenses 
Unknown for the 1893 – 1910 
years, mentioned distinctly in the 
1920, 1925 and 1930 years 
Debt service 
Mainly in the city’s global 
debt service chapter, 
mentioned distinctly in the 
1920, 1925 and 1930 years 
All loans except the ones 
listed below 
Estimated through our debt 
amortization model (Annex 2), 
data for the 1920, 1925 and 1930 
used as a test (last column of 
Table 21) 
 
Partially included in the 
Water, Sanitation and 
Canals ordinary expenses 
chapters 
Royalties paid to the CGE 
and to the former private 
companies owners of the 
canals and the 31 MF 1908 
water loan 
Included in the O&M expenses  
New 
investments 
In the water, sanitation and 
canals extraordinary 
expenses chapters  - each 
loan has its own 
extraordinary expenses 
accounting fund 
 
New investments are paid by 
extraordinary expenses funds 
coming from the loans subscribed. 
They are taken into account only 
through the debt service. 
Source : author’s elaboration 
On the contrary the water service had larger “Tariff” revenues which were entirely covering 
internalized O&M costs. “water” revenues covered external O&M costs too in the 1925 and 
1930 years and were probably large enough to cover them if they were known for the 1893, 
1899 and 1910 years too98.  
                                                 
 
98However “Tariff” revenues were not covering the full O&M costs including O&M external costs in 1920. 
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Observing the global picture of the Water, Sanitation and Canals chapters, total “Tariff” 
revenues were covering full O&M costs (including external O&M costs)99. Were the total 
“Tariff” revenues large enough to cover the debt service too ?  
Table 20 : Revenues and O&M costs of the Water, Sanitation and Canals services (1893-1930), all figures 
in MF. 
years Water 
total 
revenues 
Water 
O&M 
expenses 
Water 
external 
O&M 
costs 
Sanitation 
revenues  
Sanitation 
expenses 
Sanitation 
external 
O&M 
costs 
Canals 
revenues 
Canals 
expenses 
Canals 
external 
O&M 
costs 
1893 14. 2  4.7  1.7 5.3  1.1 0.97  
1899 19.1 5.8  3.7 3.1     
1910 26.1 10.9  6.7 8.2  1.2 1.1  
1920 41.4 27.9 37.7 10.5 19.8 25.5 1.2 3.3 1.5 
1925 107.1 42.6 11.8 31.5 24.4 11.1 2.7 2.6 0.96 
1930 248.4 78.8 32.3 57.8 35.4 15.2 5.6 4.6 2.1 
Source : author’s elaboration based on Paris’s city annual financial report. 
Results concerning the debt service’s cost 
Total “Tariff” revenues minus total internalized O&M costs can be defined as “Total Gross 
Profit A” while we will refer to Total “Tariff” revenues minus total full O&M costs (including 
external O&M costs) as “Total Gross Profit B”. 
In 1899 Total Gross Profit A (13 807 809 F) is high enough to cover the debt service amounts 
(10 708 081 F) estimated by our model100. However, if 1899 Total Gross Profit B (by 
definition lower than Gross Profit A since it includes full  O&M costs) was known it would 
probably not allow to cover the debt service. Furthermore our 1899 debt service amount 
(10 708 081 F) appear to be an underestimation of the annual 13 MF capital expenditures 
mentioned by Bechmann (Paris 1900)101. Under Bechmann estimation concerning debt 
service, there is reasonable proof that in 1899 WSC “Tariff” revenues were sufficient to cover 
internal O&M costs and the debt service but were not high enough to cover external O&M 
costs too (engineers’ salaries and energy mainly). In those years “Tariff” revenues were 
covering significant costs of the service but “financial equilibrium” was guaranteed by 
                                                 
 
99 Except in 1920, as mentioned in the above footnote. 1920 data on external O&M costs might be not fully 
reliable as figures seem excessives. 
100 Similar results are estimated for the 1893 year too. 
101 Bechmann estimated the capital assets value as 300 MF on which a 4.4% rate (globally representing interests 
and capital payoff) gives 13 304 000 F. Our model probably underestimates capital expenditures as we have only 
234 MF capital assets in 1899. Indeed, an additional simulation with a 66 MF “virtual” loan in 1865 (5% interest 
rate, 44 years duration) gives a debt service’s estimation (13 033 081 F) very close to Bechman’s one. 
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external O&M costs being absorbed by the city’s global budget in what would be considered 
as “Tax” subsidy in the OECD 3T’s methodology. 
Between 1899 and 1930, Gross Profits A and B increased significantly while the debt 
service’s order of magnitude was quite constant. Progressively Gross Profits B were high 
enough to cover the debt’s service cost meaning that “Tariff” revenue was covering the full 
financial cost of the service with no more contributions from “Tax” revenues. Next paragraph 
will focus on the key role played by inflation in modifying significantly the ratio between debt 
service’s cost, O&M costs and “Tariff” revenues.  
Table 21 : Total Gross Profits of the Water, Sanitation and Canals services (1893-1930) and debt service 
charges ; all figures in Francs. 
year Total Gross 
Profit A 
Total Gross 
Profit B 
Debt service 
model 
Debt service 
model with a 
virtual 66 MF 
loan in 1965 
Debt 
service 
(historical 
data) 
1893 5 961 850  5 154 088 7 929 088  
1899 13 807 898  10 708 081 13 033 081 13 000 000 
1910 13 824 411  9 386 544 9 386 544  
1920 2 083 763 -62 625 453 8 939 289 8 939 289 12 308 390 
1925 71 672 062 47 779 167 15 954 209 15 954 209 20 987 168 
1930 193 009 313 143 284 716 14 347 347 14 347 347 19 565 629 
Source : author’s elaboration. 
6.3 The key role of inflation 
We saw in the previous paragraph that the debt service’s amount, while staying almost 
constant, represented progressively a lower percentage of the water, sanitation and canals 
budget. Indeed Tariff revenues and O&M expenses increased significantly in those years 
while debt service stayed nearly constant. Inflation has played a key role in the borrowing-
lending relationship in determining in fine the cost-sharing equilibrium between the lender 
and the borrower. Indeed, all the loans issued by the city of Paris in those years had a fixed 
rate and most of them had long payback durations between 60 and 75 years. The great 
inflation rate of the 1910-1930 years in France had the effect of absorbing a significant part of 
the debt’s residual burden102, transferring it, from a long run point of view, away from the 
                                                 
 
102 Guerin-Schneider (2011) confirms our assumption and referring to the 1900-1940 years  states that “the major 
part of the investments in the water industry in France were financed  through fiscal sources and through 
inflation. Guerin-Schneider adds that a financing through inflation implies a social redistribution from the rich to 
the poor. In our opinion the distributional effect would need further enquiry to be proved. First of all who were 
the lenders of that time : very rich capitalists or small middle class savers as Gallais-Hamonno (2007) states for 
the Paris case ?    
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borrower on the lenders103. The graph below compares the real debt service with no inflation 
and a “virtual” debt service increased by an inflation index104 as if the payback were indexed-
link to inflation. While until 1912 inflations has a minor role (the two functions are very 
close), after 1912 French annual inflation rates increased significantly and debt service with 
inflation diverts from the no inflation curve. The area between the two curves which goes 
increasing is a good proxy of the lenders progressive absorption of significant part of the 
debt’s service in real terms.  
Figure 5 : Estimated debt service in MF (1890-1944), comparison with or without inflation 
 
Source : author’s elaboration, results from the model 
Indeed, as the Table 22 shows, total inflated debt service represents roughly 120 MF over the 
1900-1909 decade while it represents more than 800 MF over the 1920-1929 decade, meaning 
that in real terms a significant part of the debt’s burden has been absorbed by the lenders 
which happen to have made a very poor placement. In terms of long run cost-sharing 
equilibrium, inflation has played a key role since part of the capital costs have been taken 
away from the water, sanitation and canal budget.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
103 Of course this a schematic view:  “the lender” is a virtual entity as the bonds were exchanged on the market.  
104 The inflation index is on an 1890 base (equal to 1 in 1890) and comes from Piketty (2001 annex F), inspired 
from INSEE, Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique, février 1999, pp.144-145 ("coefficient de transformation du franc 
d'une année ancienne en franc”)          
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Table 22 : Total debt service over revolving periods of 10 years, comparison with or without inflation 
Years (i) Total debt service, no inflation (MF) 
(ii) Total debt service, with 
inflation (MF) Difference (iii)=(ii-i) 
1890-1899  97.82 96.76 -1.06 
1900-1909 123.09 120.61 -2.48 
1910-1919 111.06 206.22 95.16 
1920-1929 163.10 860.23 697.13 
1930-1939 143.68 960.26 816.58 
Source : author’s elaboration, results from the model 
6.4 Long run cost allocation 
In the previous paragraphs we have described the way through which water and sanitation 
revenues were collected (6.1), afterwards we have analyzed the global financial flows of the 
water, sanitation and canals service (6.2) and the effect of inflation (6.3). It’s time now to go 
back to the long-distance aqueduct example introduced at the beginning of this section.  
Not only long-distance aqueducts but also many other water and sanitation investments have 
been financed on municipal bonds issued on a long maturity at fixed interest rate (as we have 
shown in section 5). What was the long run end payer associated to such a short run financing 
solution?  We have shown in paragraph (6.2) that costs were partially covered by tax-payers 
and users (in the 1893-1910) years and progressively covered by “Tariff” revenues only 
(1920-1930). We also showed in paragraph (6.3) that lenders absorbed a significant part of 
that debt’s burden through the effect of inflation in the 1910-1930 years. 
A loan is only one of the possible “short run financing solutions” through which water, 
sanitation and canals infrastructure has been financed in Paris. Table 23 summarizes the 
various key short run financing solutions detailing the “long run end-payer”. To tackle the 
sustainability issue connected to these huge investments we also sketched in the third column 
of the following table what could be the intergenerational effect of the various possible 
combinations. 
According to the schematization of the following table let us analyze briefly what was the cost 
allocation in the long run for each of the cases described in the previous sections. The cost of 
the first phase of the Ourcq project (paragraph 3.1) was clearly supported by the local tax 
payer “of today” (of the time) since no borrowing was made and since the canal was not yet 
producing any revenues. Since the principal fiscal source consisted in consumption taxes, in 
terms of equity, distributive effects are relevant (Box 1).   
In the second phase of the canal development the concession approach was chosen (paragraph 
3.2) together with the payment of a time-spread grant. In the same time a borrowing operation 
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took place (rent emission). On the short term basis the private company is financing all the 
expenses which will be paid back by the public grant and by future revenues from navigation 
tariff. The user of the canal (navigation) and the local tax payer of tomorrow are the end-
payers105. Since the concession was bought back by public authorities (paragraph 3.3), the 
final cost allocation was different with a much larger part of the costs weighing on the tax 
payer  (less navigation after the roofing of the canal Saint Martin).  
Table 23 : Cost-sharing in the short run and in the long run 
Short run 
financing 
solution 
Long run  
end-payer  
Intergenerational 
effect 
comment Paris example 
Borrowing User of 
tomorrow 
The generation of 
tomorrow will pay for 
today’s investments 
if repayment comes from 
service revenues 
Large strategic 
water supply and 
sanitation 
investments  
National or 
Local Tax Payer 
of tomorrow 
if repayment comes from fiscal 
revenues 
Lenders  The lender of today is 
paying since he will be 
repayed tomorrow in 
money with lower 
value. 
In the case of larger than 
expected inflation and fixed 
interest rate 
Grant (public 
funds) 
Tax payer  The tax payer of 
yesterday and today is 
paying 
 Ourcq phase 1 
Public water 
authority equity 
User  The user of yesterday 
and today is paying  
In the case of a private 
investors, he will expect some 
returns on equity which will be 
payed by users of tomorrow 
 
Concession / 
private investor 
Users User of tomorrow is 
paying (navigation user) 
 Ourcq phase 2 
(navigation 
revenues ) 
Tax payers It could be repayed by 
the tax payers of today 
(initial grant) or of 
tomorrow (future grant)  
Applies if a grant element is 
associated with the concession 
Ourcq phase 2 
(initial grant and 
annuity) 
Concessionaire 
/private investor 
 This case occurs if the revenues 
are lower than expected or also 
if the  revenues are not inflation 
–adjusted and inflation is 
higher than expected.  
 
Integrated urban 
development 
mechanisms 
Owner / tenant The generation of 
tomorrow is paying 
either through purchase 
price (owner) or 
through rent value 
(tenant) 
Clearly investments burden is 
taken away from the water 
service. It is unclear however 
what was the cost allocation 
between the developer, the 
owner and the tenant. 
Water supply and 
sewer systems in 
the framework of 
Paris’s urban 
transformation 
Source : author’s elaboration 
What about the long run cost allocation for the network investment financed in Haussmann’s 
era through integrated urban development mechanisms? Infrastructure investment costs 
(including water and sewer systems) were absorbed in the global cost of each urban 
                                                 
 
105 The intergenerational equilibrium in the cost allocation has also been determined by inflation. 
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renovation operation. In the short run these costs were financed by private developer 
contractors and banks while we make the hypothesis that in the long-run they were partly 
covered by the owners and/or the tenants of the new houses through the real-estate value 
chain. It is nearly impossible to determine which part of the cost was borne by the developer 
(if the operation was not profitable as expected), by the new owner (through the purchase 
value) or by the tenant (making the hypothesis that the rent value includes a part of the urban 
infrastructure costs). However it is clear that these costs were not supported by the municipal 
budget or by the water service revenues, they were rather borne by the inhabitants (tenants or 
owners) of the flats in renovated areas. It could be argued that the “inhabitants” category of 
people overlaps very much with the “water users” category and that these people were at 
some point paying a “water levy” through the real estate value chain (rent and/or purchase 
value). One could think that whether the costs were borne by “inhabitants” or by “water 
users” is not relevant since they are overlapping categories, on the contrary we argue that it is 
a key issue to address from a distributional point of view. 
7 Conclusion 
Major water infrastructures in Paris were brought to completion by 1925 in Paris. Most of 
them, such as the gravity aqueducts, the storage units and the integrated sewer-supply 
networks are still in operations nowadays to deliver and collect water. The canals are not 
anymore a source of drinking water but are still in use for leisure and constitute a key element 
in the urban geography of Paris. 
Through a review of the major investments undertaken in water infrastructures we have 
analyzed a great variety of financing solutions: from fiscal resources to private concession, 
from bond emission to integrated urban development mechanisms. We explored and 
schematized for each kind of financing scheme what has been the long run cost allocation 
according to the various institutional solutions.  
To tackle such an issue we undertook a deep analysis of the financial flows of the water, 
sanitation and canals (WSC) service from 1893 to 1930 using the city’s annual financial 
report as the major primary source of data. Total costs (including O&M and debt service) 
were only partially accounted for within the water, sanitation and canals accounting chapter. 
Such a tight accounting interlocking between the WSC services and the municipality general 
budget is a sign per se that those services were managed as ordinary municipal departments 
even if they were labelled as “services industriels et commerciaux”. Such an industrial and 
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commercial feature is at least partially visible in the water service at the beginning of the 20th 
century as the water “Tariff” revenues were high enough to cover total O&M costs. On the 
contrary in the same years the canals and sanitation “Tariff” revenues were even below total 
O&M costs.  
In addition to that we also showed through our debt service model that water, sanitation and 
canals total “Tariff” revenues were only partially sufficient to cover full costs (including debt 
service) implying indeed that “Tax” revenues were contributing too to the Debt’s service 
coverage at least until 1912. Millward (2000, 329) describes a similar situation for water 
services in Great Britain which “made large operating surpluses but where usually not enough 
to meet loan charges”.  
Getting back to the Paris case, after 1912 things changed since the debt service stayed roughly 
constant while the revenues and other costs were increasing due to the high inflation of those 
years. The joint effect of high inflation and fixed interest rate long term loans lightened very 
significantly the municipality debt’s service in real value. The debt service represented the 
same order of magnitude of the total gross profit in 1910 while it was representing only one 
tenth of it by 1930. Indeed long term debt and inflation absorbed a huge part of the investment 
amortization costs.  
Another striking result of our case study is the essential difference in the chosen financing 
policy between lump-sum investments such as aqueducts or water treatment plants and 
networks. Not only network investments can be easily spread over time and at least partially 
absorbed by ordinary budget surplus but also they appear to be intimately linked with the 
urban transformation of the city.  
It is common for urbanists to consider the fluid networks as the blood vessels which bring life 
to the city. Victor Hugo referring to Paris urban transformation wrote that “Every time that the 
city cuts a street, the sewer stretches out an arm”.106 Our study shows that on the financial 
side too the water and sanitation networks’ extension was narrowly related to the city’s urban 
transformation as a significant part of them was financed through integrated urban 
development mechanisms based on land value capture.  
                                                 
 
106 « Chaque fois que la ville perce une rue, l’égout allonge un bras », Victor Hugo, Les Misérables, quoted by 
(Cebron de Lisle 1991, 678) 
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In terms of cost-sharing in the long run it appears that both inflation and the use of integrated 
urban development financing tools allowed to “externalize” out of the water and sanitation 
budget a considerable part of the investment costs and made easier for the water service to 
reach financial equilibrium.  
Various patterns in the financing history of Paris water infrastructure seem recurrent 
paradigms in water infrastructure finance in France. We showed for instance that although 
water and sanitation were municipal services, the central state exherted a tight control on the 
municipality since parliamentary and administrative acts were required to approve city’s loans 
and works. Indeed it was only with the 1980’s decentralisation laws that the French State 
accepted to loosen its tight control on municipalities’ finance107.  
We also saw that funds allocated by the city’s council to the water sector were often below its 
financing needs since investments in other sectors was considered more urgent. Even 
nowadays in many local authorities in France water infrastructure financing needs are revised 
downwards since loans issued are uppermost allocated to other municipal sectors, not least to 
finance investments which are more “visible” politically (tramway lines, stadium...)108. 
The use of “integrated urban development mechanisms” as major financing tools for urban 
infrastructures appear to be another recurrent paradigm in urban development. In more recent 
years similar schemes were adopted to finance urban infrastructures integrated in urban 
renovation operations such as in the French scheme of the Zone d’Amenagement Concerté 
(ZAC).109 Financing municipal investment through the mechanisms of urban development and 
real-estate added value capture is a very popular public policy choice recommended by 
international donors (Paulais 2012a; Paulais 2012b).  According to this view a city can 
capture a part of the added value created by correctly managed urban development and use 
this money to finance further urban development projects or municipal investments including 
water and sanitation infrastructure. 
                                                 
 
107 A priori control by the French parliament was then replaced by a posteriori control exherted by the regional 
accounting offices (Chambres Régionales des Comptes). 
108Data coming from various interviews undertaken by the author in October 2011 in the framework of the 
ASTEE (Association Scientifique et Technique de l’Eau et de l’Assainissement) asset management working 
group.  
109In the ZAC which were undertaken in Paris after the 70’s the networks reshaping costs were sometimes 
financed by the water operator (in fine by all the users) and sometimes covered by the developer contractor (that 
is to say by the expected gain on real estate value) 
  
58
In the early 20th century in Paris both “Tax” and “Tariff” revenues were used to cover water 
infrastructure investments costs. In 1992 the “water pays water” (“L’eau paie l’eau”) 
paradigm was implemented in France and a few years later full cost recovery was 
implemented at the European scale too through the 2000 water framework directive. Although 
international institutions softened their position on the issue of full cost recovery (according to 
the 3T’s paradigm), revenues coming from Tariff are still considered more legitimate than the 
others two T’s110. 
Nowadays investments required in water and sanitation services in France are huge both due 
to the infrastructure renewal’s burden and to the increasingly demanding environmental and 
sanitary standards. In addition to that, in the context of the 2011 sovereign debt’s crisis, 
French water and sanitation services (WSS) are faced with a severe reduction in the access to 
bank credit. It is in particular very tricky in 2012 for WSS to obtain loans with maturities 
longer than 10-15 years which are unsatisfying for long lasting infrastructure such as the 
water and sanitation ones. To think that water investments were financed to a large extent 
with very long maturities reaching 75 years might be breath-taking for many CFO within the 
French water sector. 
Nowadays the financial equilibrium of water and sanitation services in France is severely 
challenged. A rich policy debate is taking place: should the French water sector go back to a 
different mix of the 3 T’s source of revenues ? For example various policy makers wish the 
“Tax revenues” to cover the costs of rain water collection and treatment. Indeed a trend in 
favour of a different mix of water Tariff and Tax revenues is noticeable in the French water 
policy debate. Will the financial flows of the water sector in France in a few years have 
similarities with the early 20th century picture ?  
                                                 
 
110During the opening speech at the Marseille 2012 World Water Forum it has been declared by Angel Gurria, 
General Secretary of OECD,  that there is “the need to take a strategic approach to financial planning, to 
encourage greater use of water pricing and to enhance the use of water tariffs as a central part of what we call the 
3Ts – Tariffs, Taxes and Transfers” (Gurria 2012). 
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ANNEX 1 : Financial Flow of the Water, Sanitation and Canals service (1893-1930), author’s  elaboration  
 (a) (b) :c (d) :e f g h 
years Public 
buildings 
water 
revenues 
Domestic users 
water revenues 
Water total revenues Water O&M 
expenses  
Water 
external 
O&M costs 
CGE's fee Water gross 
profit  A 
Water gross 
profit B 
1893 1 362 117 12 844 684 14 206 801 4 764 582  1 625 868 9 442 219  
1899 1 995 359 17 122 401 19 117 760 5 835 992  1 864 000 13 281 768  
1910 2 444 298 23 689 165 26 133 463 10 976 375  2 182 700 15 157 088  
1920 3 495 960 37 926 843 41 422 803 27 894 536 37 691 722 1 604 518 13 528 267 -24 163 455 
1925 9 634 803 97 494 146 107 128 949 42 647 138 11 843 998 4 312 660 64 481 811 52 637 813 
1930 20 268 381 228 122 000 248 390 381 78 783 818 32 375 410 8 245 156 169 606 563 137 231 153 
 
 i j k l m n o p q r 
years Sanitation revenues  Sanitation 
O&M 
expenses 
Sanitation 
external 
O&M costs 
Sanitation 
Gross Profit 
A 
Sanitation 
Gross Profit 
B 
Canals 
revenues  
Canals 
O&M 
expenses 
Canals 
external 
O&M 
costs 
Canals 
Gross Profit 
A 
Canals 
Gross Profit 
B 
1893 1 709 000 5 369 140  -3 660 140  1 147 771 968 000  179 771  
1899 3 678 630 3 152 500  526 130       
1910 6 738 113 8 237 649  -1 499 536  1 279 859 1 113 000  166 859  
1920 10 525 793 19 836 493 25 510 651 -9 310 700 -34 821 351 1 207 724 3 341 528 1 506 843 -2 133 804 -3 640 647 
1925 31 512 318 24 445 936 11 090 979 7 066 382 -4 024 597 2 685 389 2 561 520 957 918 123 869 -834 049 
1930 57 802 952 35 423 470 15 274 225 22 379 482 7 105 257 5 651 682 4 628 414 2 074 962 1 f023 268 -1 051 694 
1893 data from the Note à l’appui du compte de dépense ; 1899 data from (Cebron de Lisle 1991, 669) and (Lemarchand 1914, 165) ; 1910 data from Note à 
l’appui du compte de dépense ; 1920,1925 and 1930 data from the Compte administratif de la ville de Paris de l’année… 
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Columns : 
(a) Public buildings water revenues (regie directe) ; includes "recette d'ordre" of municipal buildings water consumption     
(b) Gross domestic users water revenues collected by CGE, CGE's fee has  not already been deducted     
(c) Water total revenues :c=(a)+(b)     
(d) Water O&M expenses within the WSC chapter - includes CGE's fee and annual installments due to CGE and former canals concessionaires for the 
1910-1920-1925-1930 years - After 1908 it also includes debt service concerning the 1908 water loan     
(e) External O&M costs not included in WSC chapters  (f) CGE's fee, already included in (d)     
(g) Water gross profit A: g = c-d     (h) Water gross profit B :  h = g-e       
(i) Sanitation revenues       (j) Sanitation expenses     
(k) Sanitation external O&M costs     (l) Sanitation Gross Profit A   l=j-i   
(m) Sanitation Gross Profit B m=l-k    (n) Canals revenues      
(o) Canals expenses      (p) Canals external O&M costs     
(q) Canals Gross Profit A  q=o-n    (r) Canals Gross Profit B  r=q-p   
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Annex 2 : debt service model  
loan year 1860 1865 1872 1886 1894 1896 1908 1910 1921 
WSS amounts (MF) 27.5 30 19.5 60 27 117.5 31 17 107.7 
duration (years) 37 63.5 20 75 79 77 53 80 61 
interest rate (%) 4 5.09 5.99 3.88 3.63 3.45 3.783 3.59 5.75 
capital amortization (MF) 0.74 0.47 0.97 0.8 0.34 1.52 0.58 0.21 1.76 
last payback 1897 1929 1892 1961 1973 1973 1961 1990 1982 
Inputs of the debt service model, annual linear amortization, no grace period. A simulation without the 1908 loan has been undertaken too since the 1908 debt 
service was already taken into account in the O&M expenses.  
 
The inflation index is on an 1890 base (equal to 1 in 1890) and comes from (Piketty 2001 annex F), inspired from INSEE, Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique, 
février 1999, pp.144-145 ("coefficient de transformation du franc d'une année ancienne en franc”)   
